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ABSTRACT 
IRON FIST OF A SOFT POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE  
     MEASURES (ECONOMIC SANCTIONS) BY THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
BÜġRA ÇATIR 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2014 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Keywords: Common Foreign and Security Policy, Restrictive Measures, Soft Power, 
Smart Power 
 
The European Union (EU) in world politics is traditionally characterized as a ‗soft 
power‘ due to reliance on diplomatic measures rather than military force in its relations 
with the rest of the world. However, since the 1980s the EU has been increasingly using 
restrictive measures (economic sanctions) as a foreign policy tool under the domain of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since economic sanctions are defined as ‗hard 
power‘ tools, increasing use of them creates a contradiction with EU‘s traditional 
characterization in world politics. Aim of this study is to provide an explanation to this 
contradiction by analyzing the EU economic sanctions practices. In this sense, empirical 
evidence shows that the ability of the EU to use economic sanctions in an increasing 
trend stems from further integration and institutionalization of the CFSP via the 
interaction of internal and external dynamics which have led to an attempt by the EU to 
become an actor that is defined as ‗smart power‘.  
 
 
  
ÖZET 
YUMUġAK GÜCÜN DEMĠR YUMRUĞU: AVRUPA BĠRLĠĞĠ TARAFINDAN 
UYGULANAN KISITLAYICI ÖNLEMLERĠN (EKONOMĠK YAPTIRIMLAR) BĠR 
ANALĠZĠ 
 
BÜġRA ÇATIR 
Avrupa ÇalıĢmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2014 
 
DanıĢman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortak DıĢ ve Güvenlik Politikası, Kısıtlayıcı Önlemler, YumuĢak 
Güç, Zeki Güç 
 
Avrupa Birliği (AB) dıĢ iliĢkilerinde askeri güç yerine diplomatik yöntemler kullandığı 
için uluslararası alanda geleneksel olarak ‗yumuĢak güç‘ olarak tanımlanmıĢtır. Ancak, 
AB 1980‘lerin baĢından itibaren Ortak DıĢ ve Güvenlik Politikası altında kısıtlayıcı 
önlemleri (ekonomik yaptırımlar) de giderek artan bir Ģekilde dıĢ politika aracı olarak 
kullanmaya baĢlamıĢtır. Literatürde kısıtlayıcı önlemler ‗sert güç‘ politika araçları 
olarak tanımlandığı için, bu araçların artan bir Ģekilde kullanılması AB‘nin uluslararası 
arenadaki geleneksel ‗yumuĢak güç‘ tanımıyla bir zıtlık oluĢturmaktadır. Bu çalıĢmanın 
amacı AB‘nin uyguladığı kısıtlayıcı yaptırımların analizini yaparak oluĢan zıtlığa bir 
açıklama getirmektir. Analiz sonucuna göre AB‘nin kısıtlayıcı önlemleri artan bir 
Ģekilde kullanabilir hale gelmesi iç ve dıĢ dinamiklerin etkileĢimiyle ortaya çıkan Ortak 
DıĢ ve Güvenlik Politikası alanındaki entegrasyon ve kurumsallaĢmayla ile birlikte 
AB‘nin kendisini bir ‗zeki güç‘ olarak tanımlama isteğinin sonucunda mümkün 
olmuĢtur. 
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INTRODUCTION 
―When all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. This old 
saying was often used to criticize the U.S. overreliance on military force in 
its security policy. A modified version was said to characterize the 
European Union’s foreign policy — when all you have are carrots, every 
problem looks like a rabbit. But the times of the EU as the ―global payer‖ 
are over now. Instead, the EU has acquired its own hammer: sanctions‖ 
(Lehne, 2012). 
The above quoted statement from Stefan Lehne, former General Secretariat of 
the Council of European Union, gives intuitions about the European Union‘s redefined 
role at the global stage with the introduction of economic sanctions (i.e., restrictive 
measures in EU jargon) as a foreign policy tool. Use of economic sanctions has recently 
become one of the EU‘s favorite foreign policy tools through which the EU aims to 
change the behavior of the targeted actor in world politics. As of May 2014, the EU has 
47 sanctions imposed against countries from its near neighborhood to other regions of 
the world where 22 of them are still in force. This phenomenon has emerged somewhat 
surprisingly for scholars and policymakers due to traditional characterization of the EU 
as a soft power which lacks the sufficient capacity of military power to bring the desired 
change in the target‘s policies. 
Since the economic sanctions are defined as a ‗hard power‘ tool, an important 
element can be drawn from Stefan Lehne‘s statement: the EU has been drifting away its 
traditional foreign policy of overreliance on soft power tools – carrots – such as 
economic and development aid or diplomatic solution to the challenges in world 
politics. In this respect, aim of this study is to answer the following question: What are 
the underlying motivations that lead to increased reliance on economic sanctions as a 
foreign policy tool by the EU? Furthermore, as an important element to this question, 
this study also focuses on the characterization of the EU as an actor in world politics 
and tries to incorporate the how the change in instruments of foreign policy is likely to 
lead to a change in the typology of the EU‘s role in world politics.  
 In order to provide a thorough understanding to the question of interest, this 
study explains the concepts that are used to characterize the EU‘s role in world politics, 
development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and development and 
analysis of general characteristics of the EU sanctions policy, respectively. In the light 
of the arguments proposed throughout the study, it is hypothesized that further 
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integration and institutionalization of the EU‘s foreign policy through the effects of 
internal and external dynamics changed the EU‘s self-perception and initiated attempts 
for becoming an actor that is characterized as ‗smart power‘ in world politics which 
eventually led to increased use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool.  
  A detailed analysis of EU integration process shows that this change in the 
characterization of the EU in the international system with the inclusion of sanctions as 
a foreign policy tool has its roots back in the development of the EU foreign policy. 
More specifically, it can be attributed to the further integration of the foreign policy 
with more concrete steps taken which can be divided into three phases that will be 
argued in detail in the second chapter. The first phase started with the establishment of 
European Political Cooperation in the 1970 which was completed with the 1981 London 
Report. The creation of EPC represented the first serious attempt by the member states 
to have a common foreign policy where the ultimate aim was to take a more coordinated 
stance towards the issues in world politics and to ‗speak with one voice‘.  
The second phase started with the entry into force of Treaty on European Union 
in 1993 which created Common Foreign and Security Policy, successor of EPC, as a 
separate pillar of the European Union. With the TEU, the CFSP became one of the 
building blocks of the Union which facilitated further cooperation and coordination of 
the foreign policies of the member states. Therefore, the EU became more able to 
‗speak with one voice‘ in world politics although the CFSP remained as an 
intergovernmental pillar where most of the decision making power was kept by the 
member states rather than the institutions of the Union.  
Finally, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 the foreign 
policy of the Union has become more integrated mainly due to institutionalization of the 
EU foreign policy with the introduction of an administrative body European External 
Action Service and creation of a post for High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. With the help of these developments over the years, the EU 
has become a more powerful actor which can raise its voice regarding the problems it 
faces in world politics. In the light of emergence as a global actor, the EU has also 
incorporated sanctions in its foreign policy toolbox and has been increasingly 
employing them in order to induce a change in the behavior of a targeted actor. 
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Moreover, the change in the EU‘s sanctions policy in line with the further 
integration and institutionalization of the foreign policy leads to a new 
conceptualization of what kind of power the EU represents in world politics. In this 
sense, this study argues that these developments culminate into a more active Europe in 
dealing with the third parties in the world which can be characterized as an attempt to 
become a ‗smart power‘ which will be explained in the first chapter. Yet without 
sufficient military tools which have the ultimate capability of bringing the desired 
change in the third party, it is quite difficult for the EU to become a smart power as the 
term itself suggests. Therefore, since the sanctions are the ‗hardest‘ measures that the 
EU could take, the EU is becoming a ‗smart power of its own kind‘ which again reflects 
the EU‘s sui generis nature.  
In the light of this argument, this study presents an analysis of the EU sanctions 
policy practices. In order to have a more thorough understanding, first chapter focuses 
on the different theoretical conceptualizations of the EU‘s power in world politics by 
addressing a wide range of literature. The second chapter proceeds with the 
development of the EU foreign policy in a chronological order by focusing on three 
separate phases as the most important steps taken towards further integration in foreign 
policy. The third chapter presents the development of EU sanctions policy including the 
decision making procedure and the type of sanctions adopted. Then the chapter 
proceeds with a summary of the EU sanctions policy practices by dividing them into 
three separate phases according to development of foreign policy. Since the number of 
sanctions cases is large, the discussion of sanctions cases is quite limited by only 
presenting the highlights of the events. Finally, the last chapter presents a general 
characterization of the EU sanctions policy practices with regard to basic descriptive 
statistics such as duration of sanctions, geographical distribution, issue coverage, and 
types of sanctions. The study concludes with the effect of use of sanctions on EU‘s 
characterization in the world politics by building the bridge with the first chapter and 
implications for further research. 
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Methodology 
 As indicated above, the third chapter provides an analysis of the EU sanctions 
policy since the first use of sanctions in 1982 until present time. The European External 
Action Service uses ‗restrictive measures‘ and ‗sanctions‘ interchangeably and 
describes them as designed ―to bring a change in activities or policies such as violations 
of international law or human rights, or policies that do not respect the rule of law or 
democratic principles‖ (EEAS, n.d.). For this reason, the concept of ‗sanctions‘ is used 
in this study rather than ‗restrictive measures‘ in order to follow conventional wisdom 
in the literature.  
First, it is important to note that the EU adopts sanctions imposed by the United 
Nations as well as its autonomous sanctions but this study focuses on only the 
autonomous sanctions of the EU as a CFSP tool. Second, there are three types of 
sanctions according to their decision-making process. First type of sanctions is decided 
and implemented by the Community which includes sanction types as withdrawal of 
preferential trade agreements and suspension of development aid. The second type of 
sanctions are agreed under the domain of CFSP at the Council of Ministers and 
implemented by the Community institutions which include trade embargoes, financial 
sanctions, and flight bans. Finally, third type of sanctions are agreed under the domain 
of CFSP and implemented by the member states which include arms embargoes, 
restrictions on admission, diplomatic, cultural, and sports sanctions. In this sense, this 
study focuses on the former two types of sanctions which are agreed under the domain 
of CFSP. In short, the focus of this study includes only the EU autonomous sanctions 
which are imposed under the CFSP.  
 Sanctions are classified according to phases of the EU foreign policy 
development which will be explained in detail in the second chapter of this study. The 
following method is decided on the basis of major steps taken towards having a more 
concrete foreign policy at the EU level. These phases include years from 1981 to 1992 
as the first phase, from 1993 to 2008 as the second phase, and from 2009 to present time 
as the final phase. In other words, the first phase starts with the London Report and 
continues until the Treaty on European Union; the second phase ranges from TEU to 
Treaty of Lisbon, and the final phase includes years from entry into force of Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
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 The index of EU sanctions including all EU autonomous sanctions from 1981 to 
2014 is created with the help of official documents of the EU such as Council 
Decisions, Common Positions, and Joint Actions as well as other scholarly publications 
(Eriksson 2005; Kreutz 2005; Portela 2010; Giumelli 2011, 2013). The tables and 
graphs presented towards the end of the chapter are created by coding of the index in 
statistical software program Stata and the dataset is available for further use. Finally, the 
index includes more than one sanction cases for certain countries which may seem as 
double-counting. Yet, this situation stems from the fact that the EU sometimes suspends 
or removes sanctions against a certain country and imposes again after a time period. 
Therefore, a sanctions case is defined as starting when the EU imposes sanctions and 
ends when they are suspended or removed. If sanctions are renewed, they are included 
as a new sanctions case.  
In line with the argument introduced in this section of the study, the following 
chapters discuss the conceptualization of EU‘s power, development of EU‘s foreign 
policy, and finally an analysis of EU‘s sanctions policy practices. In this regard, the next 
chapter deals with the question of how the EU is characterized as an actor at the global 
stage throughout the years since its establishment.  
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CHAPTER I: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN WORLD POLITICS – 
UNIDENTIFIED POLITICAL OBJECT?
1
 
Since its establishment, the EU‘s attempts for creating a common foreign policy 
without a single state raised many questions about the capabilities and limitations of the 
EU in world politics as an important actor. One strand of the literature on the EU 
foreign policy has focused on whether the EU has a foreign policy or not (Bull 1982; 
Kagan 2004), while other strand of the literature has focused more on the nature of the 
EU‘s power in world politics such as civilian power (Duchene 1972; Holsti 1995; Hill 
1983; Stravridis 2001; Whitman 2002; Larsen 2002), normative power (Manners 2002; 
Young 2004; Diez 2005); military/strategic power (Smith 2000; Sjursen 2006; Hyde-
Price 2006); superpower (McCormick 2007; Moravcsik 2009), and finally smart power 
(Nossel 2004; Nye 2011). The choice of different strands of literature in understanding 
the EU‘s role in world politics stems from the intertwined nature of the discussions and 
their cumulative understanding. Since the power is the core concept of this chapter, 
conceptualization of power is discussed briefly before going into detail with the 
literature on the EU‘s power.  
 
What is Power? 
 
Similar to any other debate in the literature of international studies, the 
conceptualization of the EU‘s foreign policy has also been affected by the nature of the 
international system. In this sense, it is important to define the concept of ‗power‘ with 
regard to the concepts covered in this chapter. Power is usually defined as one‘s ability 
to exert influence on the other to do something that otherwise he/she would not do 
(Dahl, 1957, p. 202). It has been one of the central concepts in the study of world 
politics which has dominated the major debates for a long time. Scholars of 
international relations theories have discussed the concept of power in world politics 
and have attempted to understand and explain the process in world politics by using the 
concept of power. The conceptualization of power, among many others, has been 
dependent on the conjuncture and developments in the international arena. First 
                                                          
1
 The concept of ‗unidentified political object‘ for defining the EU is first used by 
former Commission President Jacques Delors during his speech in Luxembourg, 1985. 
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attempts of conceptualization of power took place in the Cold War years which was 
highly affected by the realist theory of international politics. 
Hans Morgenthau (1954) was the proponent of the defining the theoretical core 
of international relations based on the concept of power. Morgenthau, based on the 
assumptions on human nature, argues that ―international politics, like all politics, is a 
struggle for power‖. According to him, all states in the international system seek to 
maximize power in order to dominate the others and power is an ‗end‘ itself. Kenneth 
Waltz was another realist scholar who took a different approach than Morgenthau and 
attempted to conceptualize power in international relations differently. Waltz (1979) 
argues that power is not an ‗end‘; rather it is a ‗means‘ for states in order to retain their 
existence in the international arena. According to Waltz, power is the capacity of one 
state to affect the behavior of other state (p. 191). Since the ultimate end for states is to 
seek for power (for Morgenthau) and for survival (for Waltz), the common 
characteristic of power in both scholars‘ work is the coercive nature of power which is 
identified by military capacity.
2
  
 While the Cold War was approaching to détente years, the conceptions of power 
started to change in international politics. In the early years of 1970s, Klaus Knorr 
(1973) called attention for the difference between ‗coercive power‘ and ‗non-coercive 
power‘ (p. 3). Neo-liberal institutionalist scholars have argued that the outcomes in the 
international relations cannot be explained only by referring to crude power of states. 
Keohane and Nye (1977) argue that military capability is not the sole important 
indicator of the power of a state; rather there are transnational issues such as trade and 
monetary relations that have strong influence on the relations among states. According 
to Keohane and Nye, these new relations among states will lead to a world which is 
characterized by complex interdependence among different actors. In such a world, the 
military capabilities of states would not be important any more.  
In short, the conceptualization of power in world politics is highly affected by 
two dominant schools of thought. Realists, throughout the years, have argued that power 
is the key determinant of the relations among states and it is crucial in understanding the 
                                                          
2
 Since realism as a school of thought has variant theories in itself, scholars diverge in 
their conceptions of power and the role of power in international relations. For a more 
detailed discussion on the role of power among realist scholars please see Schmidt 
(2005).  
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dynamics of war and peace. On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalist scholars have 
focused on other concepts, such as economic and transnational relations, as the other 
important determinants of the relations among political entities. Therefore realist 
approaches emphasize the hard power capacities of states which enable them to 
influence other states and to protect themselves from interference while neoliberal 
institutional approaches emphasize the soft power capabilities such as cultural 
attraction, ideology, and international institutions as the main resources at the global 
arena.  
 
Contemporary Conceptualizations of Power and the EU‟s Role in     
         World Politics 
 
As the definition of power emanated from its match with ‗force‘, variations for 
the concept of power have emerged. In 1990, Joseph Nye developed the notion of ‗soft 
power‘ in order to describe the ability to co-opt rather than coerce and the ability to 
shape the preferences of others in world politics. According to Nye (2004), power 
depends on the nature of the relationship between the two sides. Due to this nature, 
having power resources does not guarantee one side to reach the desired outcomes by 
coercing the other as the situation of the United States during the Vietnam War (p. 3).  
Nye argues that measurement of power was easier in earlier periods because its 
meaning was generally attributed to the ‗strength for war‘ during the two world wars (p. 
3). However, with globalization and the era of technological development, power has 
become a concept that is difficult to measure. In this sense, Nye argues that the 
distribution of power resources in contemporary world resembles to a three dimensional 
chess game in which one can play both vertically and horizontally. Interstate military 
issues stands on the top of the chess board. At this point, the United States (US) has the 
place as the superpower with the overwhelming military capacity in the unipolar 
international system. Interstate economic issues follow interstate military issues and it is 
placed in the middle of the chess board. Unlike the interstate military issues, the 
distribution of power is multipolar in this dimension. Although the US is the only 
superpower in terms of military capability, in economic terms she cannot act 
unilaterally and she needs the cooperation of the other economically strong states and 
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entities such as China, Japan, and the EU. Transnational issues stands at the bottom of 
the chess board which consist of issues like terrorism, international crime, and climate 
change. Power is widely distributed at this dimension and cooperation among state and 
non-state actors is weak for these issues (p. 4).  
According to Nye, in such a complex world of international relations, acting as if 
playing on a single dimension would lead to failure for leaders where using soft power 
assets become required. Therefore, it has become important to attract others in world 
politics rather than coerce or threaten to persuade them (p. 5). Soft power seems to work 
when an actor is persuaded by the means of attraction without any threat. However, soft 
power is not only related to persuasion, its value rests on the ability to attract which then 
leads to acquiescence because persuasion can also take place by threatening the others 
with force (pp. 6-7). Therefore, the sources of soft power differ from traditionally 
defined measures of power.  
According to Nye, there are three sources of soft power. First, ‗culture‘ refers to 
an area of attraction where a country‘s culture consists of universal values and its 
policies create values to be shared among others. This universalistic culture of a country 
increases the probability of reaching the desired outcomes in the behaviors of other 
states. The US is one of the beneficiaries of universal culture whose values are shared 
by others, though not by all, in the international arena. For example, commerce is a 
means of spreading a culture (pp. 11-13). ‗Political values‘ is the second source of soft 
power. ‗Political values‘ refers to government policies at home such as democracy and 
rule of law. The values that a government pursues at home may have an effect of 
attraction to others. Finally, foreign policy of a state is a source of soft power as well. A 
state with its foreign policy can create an area of attractiveness for other states in the 
international system (pp. 13-14).  
A soft power also pursues general goals more than it pursues specific goals in its 
foreign policy what Arnold Wolfers (1962) calls as ‗milieu goals‘ and ‗possession 
goals‘. In Wolfers‘ own words:  
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―In directing its foreign policy toward the attainment of its possession goal, a 
nation is aiming at the enhancement or the preservation of one or more of the 
things to which it attaches value. The aim may apply to such values as a stretch 
of territory, membership in the Security Council of the United Nations, or tariff 
preferences… Milieu goals are of a different character. Nations pursuing them 
are out not to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of 
others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their natural boundaries. 
If it were not for the existence of such goals, peace could never become an 
objective of national policy‖ (p. 73).  
 
Nye‘s analysis of soft power is mostly based on the US as the leading soft power 
in world politics. Yet, he argues that the US is not alone in the world as a soft power. 
According to Nye, although any single European country cannot compete with the US 
in size, the Union of European states as a whole is a good prospect of soft power. 
Europe, a continent without the possibility of war, offers a hopeful image for future for 
other states in the world (p. 77). European Union with its united structure over 
important policies such as trade, agriculture, human rights, and monetary policies is 
becoming a positive force for solving global problems. European countries with their 
widespread culture and widely spoken languages are attracting other states in the world. 
The values European governments pursue at home are creating an area of attraction for 
others. For example, policies pursued on capital punishment, control on the use of guns, 
and global warming are appealing young people from different countries (p. 79). 
Together with their culture and political values, foreign policies of the European states 
are also source for Europe‘s soft power. He argues that Europeans provide more than 
half of the world‘s overseas development aid and provide troops to peacekeeping 
operations, and most importantly European approach of multilateralism makes 
European policies attractive for other states (p. 81). With these sources, the EU stands 
as the biggest competitor of the US as a soft power in world politics.  
 Joseph Nye‘s analysis of EU as a soft power is an important characterization of 
the EU as a player in world politics. The EU both in its internal politics and foreign 
policy reflect most of the features of a soft power. In its foreign policy, the EU is 
generally not regarded as keen on using ‗hard‘ military power in order to achieve its 
objectives contrary to the US. Instead, it appears to focus on multilateralism and 
diplomatic means rather than relying on military power to execute its foreign policy. 
Although soft power is not always coined to describe the EU, various terms that reflect 
the characteristics of soft power such as ‗civilian power‘, ‗normative power‘, ‗quiet 
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superpower‘ and ‗postmodern superpower‘ have been used by scholars (Duchêne, 1972; 
Manners, 2002; Moravscik, 2002; McCormick, 2007). However, the introduction of 
sanctions as a foreign policy tool represents a drifting away from EU‘s traditional 
means of using power in its relations with the rest of the world. With the introduction of 
sanctions which are characterized as ‗hard power tools‘, the EU can also be 
characterized as smart power (Rehn 2009; Nye 2011) which is a term originally used to 
represent US a decade ago and found resonance in European affairs as well.  
Joseph Nye‘s concept of soft power was not the first characterization of the EU 
as an actor in world politics. The first attempt for conceptualizing the Europe‘s role 
came in 1972 by François Duchêne who coined the term ‗civilian power‘. According to 
Duchêne the EU is ―a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on 
armed force‖. He urges that ―the European Community must be a force for the 
international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards or it will itself be more or 
less the victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself‖ 
(1973, pp. 19-20). The EU with its internal characteristics can exert influence in world 
affairs. However, Duchêne did not develop a clear-cut definition for civilian power and 
this gap was filled by Hans Maull (1990) who defined civilian power as: 
 
―the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit 
of international objectives; the concentration on non-military, primarily 
economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual 
instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international 
interaction; and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address 
critical issues of international management‖ (pp. 92-93).  
 
Other scholars have also contributed to the development of the concept of 
civilian power. Karen Smith (2005) puts forward four key elements to civilian power: 
means, ends, the use of persuasion, and civilian control over foreign policy making. 
Means are defined as resorting non-military instruments such as economic, diplomatic, 
and cultural means to achieve goals while ends refer to the preference of international 
cooperation over coercion. She argues that although scholars do not include all these 
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elements to their definition of civilian power all these features are important in order to 
draw the line between what is civilian power and what is not (pp. 2-3).   
 The ways used as means to achieve ends are also important to define a civilian 
power. Holsti (1995) argues for six ways in which an actor can influence other 
international actors: persuasion by giving a response without the possibility of 
punishment; offering rewards; granting rewards; threatening by punishment; resorting 
non-violent punishment; and finally using force (pp. 125-126). An actor which uses 
non-military and mostly economic measures are defined as a civilian power. 
Christopher Hill (2003) also puts forward four ways to categorize exercising power and 
influence. To compel another actor to do something, an actor can use force or deterrence 
or it can sway another actor‘s decisions by using persuasion and deference (p. 137). 
Hill (1983) is one of the proponents of the ‗civilian power Europe‘ argument. He 
argues that the European Union is playing an important role in world affairs by placing 
diplomacy over coercive instruments, searching for mediation in international crises, 
and providing economic solutions to political problems (p. 200). Therefore, diplomacy 
and multilateral approach to problem solving reflects the civilian nature of the European 
Union. Hill (1990) also argues that the EU‘s international behavior can be categorized 
into two models. First one is the civilian power model which refers to the EU‘s reliance 
on persuasion and negotiation in communicating with the other states in the world and 
solving of the international problems. The second one is the power bloc model which 
refers to the EU‘s appeal to its economic strength in order to reach the political 
objectives. He argues that the civilian power Europe argument should not be discredited 
because there are limitations to power politics as well and any attempt by the EU to 
become a ‗superpower‘ would contradict with its civilian power characteristics. 
A strong criticism to civilian power Europe concept was directed by Hedley Bull 
(1982) who argues that although the attention is shifted to economic, social, and cultural 
matters in world politics, the military issues are still important. Lacking the means for 
providing security for itself and relying on the US for defense presents vulnerability for 
European states. In Bull‘s own words, ―Europe is not an actor in international affairs, 
and does not seem likely to become one‖ (p. 151). He argues that the civilian 
characteristics held by Europe depend on the safe environment provided by the US with 
its military capability. He suggests that Europe should develop a self-sufficient means 
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for defense because of the diverging interests with the US, the continuous threat coming 
from the Soviet Union, and for regeneration of Europe (p. 152). He proposes seven 
ways to acquire self-sufficient defense measures: the development of nuclear deterrent 
forces; the improvement the quality of conventional forces; a more important role 
played by Western Germany; more commitment and loyalty by France; a change of 
policy in Britain; careful attention to the Soviet Union; and careful co-existence with the 
United States (pp. 157-162). 
After Bull‘s criticism to the concept of civilian power Europe, Hill (1993) 
readdressed the same question and he agreed with Bull on the point that the European 
Union is not an effective actor for producing collective actions and impacts on the 
problems in world affairs. Yet, he approaches the question from a different perspective 
by underlining the difference between the EU‘s ‗actorness‘ and ‗presence‘ in world 
politics. He argues that there is a gap between what the European Union is capable to 
fulfill the functions in the international system and what is expected from the European 
Union by the third parties (p. 306). The external demands directed to the European 
Union are not compatible with the EU‘s ability to agree, its resources, and the 
instruments it has in order to meet these demands (p. 315). According to Hill, two 
measures should be taken in order to fill this capability-expectations gap. The EU 
should improve attempts in the long run to improve its capability in international 
relations and it should attempt to develop patterns of cooperation in foreign policy by 
recognizing the importance of complex interdependence (p. 326).  
The beginning of 2000s has witnessed an important debate about the effect of 
militarizing of the EU on its civilian characteristics. Karen Smith (2000) has argued that 
civilian power Europe argument carries a great irrelevance due to the attempts by the 
EU for acquiring military power. She argues that although the end of the Cold War has 
reinforced the expectations about the importance of a civilian power and its effects on 
world politics, the EU has been moving away from being civilian power (p. 11). Until 
the signing of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the EU has been 
identified as a civilian power by relying on economic and diplomatic means and by 
lacking military instruments (p. 13). According to Smith, there are three developments 
which triggered the demands for the adoption of European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI). First, with German unification there emerged the need for deepening of 
European integration in order to include united Germany to European multilateralism. 
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Second, the US has started to withdraw its forces from Europe with the end of the Cold 
War which led to Europe to carry this responsibility. Third, acquiring military power 
did not seem irrelevant anymore to Europeans (pp. 14-15). By going under this process, 
the EU has started to abandon its civilian power characteristics.  
On the contrary to Smith, some scholars argue that acquiring military power 
does not mean  that the EU is moving away from being civilian power. Stelios 
Stravridis (2001) claims that ―thanks to the militarising of the Union, the EU might at 
long last be able to act as a real civilian power in the world, that is to say as a force for 
the external promotion of democratic principles‖ (pp. 43-44). According to him, the 
definition of civilian power provided by Duchêne consists of two main characteristics; 
first one is ―a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed 
forces‖ and the second characteristic is ―a force for the international diffusion of civilian 
and democratic standards‖ He argues that scholars have only focused on the first 
characteristic while the second one is mostly overlooked (p. 44). The debate about the 
civilian power Europe has ignored the more important issue of how to promote civilian 
and democratic standards without having military power. Therefore, he claims that 
using only first part of Duchêne‘s definition is not enough to conceptualize the EU‘s 
role in world affairs. According to him, civilian power lacks the capability to bring the 
desired change in the EU‘s relations with the rest of the world if it only depends on non-
military capabilities. What makes an entity a civilian power is how these capabilities are 
employed. Therefore, the EU would be still a civilian power by promoting democracy 
and human rights although it acquires military power (p. 48). 
 Richard Whitman (2002) also argues that the development of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy with the Treaty on European Union does not mean the end of the 
EU‘s civilian power. Rather, he contends, it is possible to account for the development 
of CFSP is compatible with the nature of civilian power Europe which would contribute 
to the EU‘s international identity (p. 20). Similarly, Henrik Larsen (2002) argues that 
the militarizing aspect of the EU foreign policy does not reflect that the EU is moving 
away from being a civilian power. He admits that this is an important change in the 
foreign policy of the EU which has usually been identified with non-military means. 
However, military capability is adopted as a last resort for conflict resolution which 
means that ―they are one kind of means among many‖ (p. 292). 
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The debate about the EU as a civilian power is important in the sense that it 
brought a new aspect to European foreign policy as a research area. The EU as a civilian 
power moved the debate on another stage that is interested in the ‗type‘ of the EU‘s 
‗actorness‘ rather than whether the EU has a foreign policy or not (Sjursen, 2006, p. 
235). However, the concept of civilian power was developed during the Cold War years 
and with the changing nature of the international relations after the Cold War, a new 
concept developed by Ian Manners has overcome the concept of civilian power Europe 
(Whitman, 2006, p. 2).  
Manners (2002) has brought a new aspect to the role of the EU in international 
relations by coining the term ‗normative power‘. On the contrary to Smith, he argues 
that the development of CFSP does not represent a departure from civilian elements in 
the EU‘s international role (p. 237). He criticizes Duchêne‘s civilian power Europe and 
Bull‘s notion of military power on the basis that their understandings of international 
relations were limited to the frozen nature of the Cold War years by relying on the 
assumptions of fixed nature of the nation-state, the importance of crude force, and the 
emphasis on national interests. However, the end of the Cold War witnessed the 
revolutions in most of the Eastern European countries which means that the ideas have 
become as important as physical force. Therefore, he argues, by focusing on the power 
of ideas rather than the physical power the role of the EU in world affairs can be 
understood better (p. 238). 
Manner‘s conceptualization of the EU is an attempt to shift the analysis of the 
EU‘s international role from civilian/military power argument to ideational impact of 
the EU as a normative power. Therefore, the concept of normative power Europe is 
focused on ―the power over opinion, idée force, or ideological power‖ (p. 239). 
According to him, the EU‘s normative difference depends on its historical context, 
hybrid polity, and political-legal constitution. Historical context refers to the conditions 
upon which the EU is structured after experiencing brutalities of numerous wars. 
Learning the lessons of the past, Europe, now, aims at preserving and strengthening 
peace and prosperity of the continent. The hybrid polity means that the EU transcends 
classical Westphalian norms of nation-state with its supranational and international 
means of governance. Finally, political-legal constitution refers to the values the EU is 
based on such as democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. According to 
Manners, these three features contributed to the commitment to the universal norms and 
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principles by the EU member states which in turn reflect the normative nature of the EU 
(pp. 240-241).  
In order to analyze the normative basis of the EU, Manners identifies five core 
and four minor norms that are located within acquis communautaire and acquis 
politique. The five core norms are the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. He identifies 
four minor norms as social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and 
principle of good governance. This basis of normative power has been developed by the 
EU‘s treaties, policies, conditions, and declarations (pp. 242-243). These norms are 
diffused by contagion and transference (pp. 244-245).  
By suggesting that the EU is not only found on a normative basis but also acting 
in a normative way in international relations, he says that ―the EU as a normative power 
has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of 
norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change 
norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act 
to extend its norms into the international system‖ (p. 252). According to him, the ability 
to determine what is ‗normal‘ in international affairs is the greatest power an entity can 
carry in world politics (p. 253).  
Thomas Diez (2005) argues that the discourse of the normative power Europe 
has become a significant practice of European identity construction with the attempts of 
the changing others by spreading the norms the EU based on (p. 614). According to 
him, the discourse of the EU as a normative power works on the basis of creating 
‗other‘ and representing itself as a force for good in changing the other‘s policies (p. 
633). On the contrary to Manners, he argues that normative power is embedded in the 
concept of civilian power rather than being a completely different notion
3
 (p. 635).  
Normative power Europe argument has contributed to the debate regarding the 
EU‘s international role and it has been subject to criticism by numerous scholars. 
Richard Youngs (2004) argues that although the ideational dimensions of the EU‘s 
international role have become more important, the norms and values promoted 
demonstrate the EU‘s security concerns as well. According to Youngs, some aspects of 
                                                          
3
 For Manner‘s response to Diez, please see Manners (2006).  
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the human rights policies of the EU reflect the security-based concerns of the EU. This 
becomes obvious by instrumentalist bias to some human rights policies and the role 
played by strategic actors in decision-making process (p. 431).  
Adrian Hyde-Price is another strong critique of normative power Europe 
concept. Hyde-Price (2006) argues that the literature on the conceptualization of EU 
foreign policy has been shaped around liberal-idealist theory but structural realism 
offers a more concrete understanding of the EU as an international actor. According to 
him, structural realism analyses the structural determinants of the EU foreign policy in 
contrast to liberal-idealist theory‘s explicit and normative approach (p. 218). The 
foundation of the EU is strongly related to the bipolar nature of the Cold War and after 
the Cold War the EU itself has evolved into a multipolar entity. In this sense, Hyde-
Price argues, since the end of the Cold War ―the EU was used by its most influential 
member states as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic power, shaping 
its ‗near abroad‘ in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and economic interests of 
its member states‖ (pp. 226-227).  
In dealing with its near abroad which consists of post-communist states, the EU 
has employed instruments based both on soft power and hard power. By using these 
instruments such as coercive economic statecraft in the form of ‗conditionality‘, the 
influential states of the EU have attempted to impose their perspective of political and 
economic order to those states in transformation process. This shows that the EU 
―serves as an instrument of collective hegemony, shaping its external milieu through 
using power in a variety of forms: political partnership or ostracism; economic carrots 
and sticks; the promise of membership or the threat of exclusion‖, rather than acting as 
a normative power in world politics (p. 227).  
 Helene Sjursen (2006) approaches normative power Europe argument from an 
ontological perspective by discussing the distinguishing characteristics of a ‗normative 
power‘. According to Sjursen, the conceptualization of the EU as a normative or civilian 
power in the literature lacks sufficient definitions and criteria for a strong assessment in 
order to test whether the EU is a ‗force for good‘ or not (p. 236). She argues that 
without such criteria for assessment, the results of any analysis about whether the EU is 
a normative power is destined to be the personal opinions of researchers (p. 248).   
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Upon this argument, Sjursen suggests that a powerful indicator of normative 
power Europe would depend on the legal principles its foreign policy is based on. 
Therefore, a cosmopolitan dimension to international law would work as an indicator 
for normative or civilian power Europe. In this sense, ―a normative power would be one 
that seeks to overcome power politics through a strengthening of not only international 
but cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of individuals and not only the rights of 
states to sovereign equality. It would be a power that is willing to bind itself, and not 
only others, to common rules‖ (p. 249). Taking this definition as a criterion, Sjursen 
argues that there is a contradiction between the EU‘s approach to multilateralism with 
regard to foreign policy with emphasis on external sovereignty and human rights and its 
external policies. This contradiction makes it harder to define the EU as a normative 
power in world politics (p. 249).  
Additionally, Michelle Pace (2007) argues that the literature on normative power 
Europe has ignored the ‗construction‘ of normative power Europe and in what ways this 
construction makes the EU unable to have an influence in world affairs (p. 1043). She 
tests her argument with the case study of Arab-Israeli conflict that the EU is willingly 
involved. She argues that the EU‘s response to the elections in Palestine in 2006 which 
concluded with the victory of Hamas disappointed Palestinian people who took a step 
towards democratization. The EU‘s reaction to elections has discredited the values it 
relies on such as free, fair, and transparent elections. In her own words, ―the success of 
Islamist parties does not seem to feature on the EU‘s normative radar‖ (p. 1060). In this 
sense, the Arab-Israeli conflict reveals that the construction of the normative power 
Europe ‗disempowers‘ the EU‘s role as a global player in world politics. 
Another strong criticism to normative power Europe argument comes from 
Steve Wood (2009) who takes EU‘s attempts to democratize Russia as a case study. He 
argues that although the EU perceives its values to be universal which are same for all 
societies and states, it is not able to spread these norms to other states when those states 
have strong bargaining tools. The EU‘s attempts to democratize Russia seem 
unsuccessful within the context of the relationship in which the EU depends on the 
energy supplied by Russia. The EU‘s dependence on energy from Russia reveals the 
failure of the EU‘s capacity and commitment as a normative power in world politics. In 
Wood‘s own words ―the EU‘s mission civilisatrice is susceptible to a relatively 
straightforward if unpleasant realpolitik that can expose a rhetoric-behavior gap…When 
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faced with resistance to a (potentially) vigorous promotion of democracy and human 
rights, or when imperatives that compel it to modify or rescind such activity enter the 
equation, the EU appears a rather powerless normative power‖ (pp. 127-128). 
 The EU is also defined as a superpower by some scholars. John McCormick 
(2007) challenges the conventional wisdom that believes great powers can only be 
states with large military capabilities that seek for their own national interests. His 
argument is based on the relative decline of old-style power politics and on the increase 
in the role of globalization and interdependence in world politics. According to him, 
―the ownership of the means of production is more important than ownership of the 
means of destruction, and cooperation is more effective than coercion‖ (p. 2). These 
developments in world affairs paved the way for the emergence of a post-modern 
environment in which the EU rises as a superpower.  
 There are three overlapping arenas where the change in the international system 
can be observed. First, the developments took place in the EU itself increased the EU‘s 
strength and sharpened its identity. With the single market structure, the EU has become 
the world‘s biggest economy. Furthermore, adoption of a single currency has challenged 
the dominance of US dollar in the global market. Second, the developments internal to 
the US have also revealed the changes in world politics. The long-term domestic 
economic problems; and social and political divisions have weakened the US and 
allowed the EU to compete with the US. Finally, the developments in the international 
environment itself with the change in the understanding of what constitutes power and 
security has brought a new aspect to world politics and increased the importance of 
globalization and interdependence (pp. 5-6). In this new system, the EU has emerged as 
a superpower that: 
―relies upon soft power to express itself and to achieve its objectives, and that 
finds itself at a moral advantage in an international environment where violence 
as a means of achieving influence is increasingly detested and rejected, and at a 
strategic advantage because its methods and priorities fit more closely with the 
needs and consequences of globalization. The EU has become influential by 
promoting values, policies and goals that appeal to other states in a way that 
aggression and coercion cannot. In so doing, it has redefined our understanding 
of the meaning of power‖ (pp. 6-7).  
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Similarly, Andrew Moravcsik (2009) argues that the European Union is a 
‗quiet superpower‘.4 In contrast to conventional wisdom which argues that the role of 
EU is in decline, he claims that Europe remains as a superpower along with the US in 
a bipolar world (p. 405). The European states are the only states besides the US that 
are able to exert influence upon other states by acting on a wide spectrum from 
‗hard‘ to ‗soft‘ measures (p. 407). By acquiring military power and possessing a 
civilian power, Europe has become a more hospitable place for the spread of 
European forms of power. According to Moravcsik, this means that ―there is every 
reason to believe that Europe‘s rise in power will continue (p. 418).  
A new phenomenon in conceptualizing power in world politics has emerged in 
the last decade – the concept of smart power. The concept was first coined in discussing 
the US foreign policy after the increasing antagonism towards the US and its role in 
world politics following the Iraq intervention of 2003. In fact, the effectiveness of using 
hard power – coercion rather than persuasion – in foreign affairs became under scrutiny 
both by scholars and politicians. However, scholars also argue that soft power is not 
enough to achieve foreign policy goals which sometimes remain inefficient.  
First attempt to theorize the concept of ‗smart power‘ was introduced by 
Suzanne Nossel in her Foreign Affairs article in 2004 where she urges for the need to 
renew neoliberal institutionalism. By trying to revitalize the value of multilateralism in 
US foreign policy, she argues that ―smart power means knowing that the United States‘ 
own hand is not always its best tool‖ (p. 138). She goes on to say that ―unlike 
conservatives, who rely on military power as the main tool of statecraft, liberal 
institutionalists see trade, diplomacy, foreign aid, and the spread of American values as 
equally important‖. Therefore, to build efficient ways to prevent the challenge proposed 
by terrorism would require reactivating a well-established policy framework which also 
includes soft power instruments at the same importance level as the military might. In 
this respect, smart power leads to reframe the security issues the US faces after 9/11 
into a progressive liberal structure (p. 132).  
Upon the contributions by Nossel, the term was theorized by Joseph Nye (2004, 
2011) who also coined the term ‗soft power‘ in 1990s. According to Nye ―smart power 
                                                          
4
 Originally, the ‗quiet superpower‘ concept was coined in 2002 by Moravcsik but he 
developed the concept in detail in 2009.   
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is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means 
developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American 
objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power‖. Smart power, as Nye elaborates, was 
an attempt to fix the misperceptions regarding the soft power‘s ability to achieve 
preferable outcomes in foreign policy. In his own words: 
 
―Power is one’s ability to affect the behavior of others to get what one 
wants. There are three basic ways to do this: coercion, payment, and 
attraction. Hard power is the use of coercion and payment. Soft power is the 
ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction. If a state can set the 
agenda for others or shape their preferences, it can save a lot in carrots and 
sticks. But rarely can it totally replace either. Thus there is need for smart 
strategies that combine the tools of both hard and soft power‖ (Nye, 2009, 
p. 160).  
 
The discussion on smart power is largely stems from Nye‘s concept of soft power 
where he resembles the power politics in the world as a three dimensional chess where 
actors both play vertically and horizontally. The twenty-first century presents challenges 
to decision-makers not only at the international level but also at transnational and global 
level. In order to confront these challenges what is needed is neither mere use of hard 
power nor soft power only (Nye & Armitage, 2007, pp. 10-11). Therefore, the question 
of which power resources are available to actors carries a great importance. Hard power, 
by definition, refers to ability for a political entity to get what it wants through military 
coercion and economic payments while soft power is traditionally defined as to achieve 
the goals through attraction. Since the smart power is a skilful combination of the two, it 
can be summed up as the combined use of military and economic powers by including 
public and general diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign aid, civic action, and 
economic development.  
 Nye (2011) argues that since a strategy relates means to ends it requires a 
clarification of goals (preferred outcomes), resources, and tactics for their use. In this 
respect, a smart power strategy should provide answer to five questions. First, ―what 
goals or outcomes are preferred?‖ This question stems from the limitations of the ability 
to get what one wants and the nature of structural trade-off among objectives. Second 
question is ―what resources are available and in which contexts?‖ This question refers to 
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the importance of understanding the usefulness of available resources in reaching 
objectives rather than focusing only on the complete inventory of resources. Then, the 
following question is ―what are the positions and preferences of the targets of influence 
attempts?‖ which aims to understand and explain the potential capabilities of opponents. 
More specifically, it aims to identify the motivations and intentions of the targets of the 
foreign policy. This objective leads to the fourth question which is ―which forms of 
behavior are most likely to succeed?‖ This question is intended to understand, given the 
conditions, which behaviors among broad range of tools such as coercion, co-optation, 
persuasion, or the combination of them will be more likely to achieve the desired 
outcomes. Finally, the fifth question that a smart power strategy should answer is ―what 
is the probability of success?‖ which refers the necessity for careful calculation of the 
costs and benefits of the tools that are used. If a smart power strategy fails to answer the 
final question, as Nye argues, there is a need to start over from the first question (pp. 
208-209). 
 As the concept of ‗smart power‘ became a point of interest in the US and the 
President Barack Obama‘s foreign policy, it has gained a considerable resonance in the 
European politics as well. Although the works of McCormick (2007) and Moravcsik 
(2009) explained above focused on the EU‘s potential capability of using both soft 
power and hard power tools, they did so only implicitly. However, in the recent years, 
the focus on the EU as a potential smart power has increased by policy makers and 
bureaucrats of the Union though without considerable scholarly work. The hybrid 
nature of the EU‘s foreign policy can serve as an important test for the concept of smart 
power. Nye‘s concept of power highly resembles the EU‘s concept of security as being 
global, all-inclusive, and not being based on only the number of people under the 
armies. In fact, a smart power strategy can give the EU a genuine role in world politics 
by maintaining its security through comprehensive tools available – ranging from 
development aid (soft power tools) to economic sanctions (hard power tools).  
 One of the early supporters of the ‗smart power Europe‘ is Ferrero-Waldner, the 
Commissioner for Foreign Relations, who argues that the EU has become a smart power 
in important areas in her speech in 2007. According to Ferrero-Waldner, the Iraq War of 
2003 brought the end of hard power and soft power often lacks the ability to face the 
challenges of the modern world. She argues that with a population of more than half a 
billion people the EU constitutes the world‘s largest trading entity and the largest donor 
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of economic and development aid with almost sixty percent of global resources. 
Recently, these soft power instruments are also combined with hard power tools such as 
Mission Atlanta as the EU‘s first naval mission, and those in Darfur, the Balkans, the 
EUPOL mission in Afghanistan and the EUBAM mission in Rafah. She goes on to say 
that ―these examples show that the EU has broken free of the classic distinction between 
hard and soft power‖ (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007, pp. 4-5). 
 Another strong supporter of the smart power EU approach is former 
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn who views smart power as a policy tool 
which helps to redefine the EU‘s role in world politics. He defines smart power as 
―combining soft and hard power better in the EU's external relations by using the whole 
spectrum of the Union‘s policy instruments and economic resources‖ (Rehn, 2009, p. 
3). His argument follows the EU‘s role as a global actor which became more engaged in 
global affairs over the years initially in economic areas such as aid and trade and 
recently in diplomacy and security missions outside of its borders. He proposes three 
ways to improve the Union‘s smart power strategy. First proposition requires making 
the EU‘s external policies more coherent and effective. He urges for the need to upgrade 
external policy instruments and make them work better together. Second, the 
institutional architecture of the Union needs to be improved by implementing the 
reforms to external policy making. In this sense, he states, the combination of the tasks 
of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy with the post of Commission 
Vice President for External Relations is a step towards better governance of the external 
policies. Finally, he argues that the need to spread the values and interests more 
effectively to extend the European zone of peace and prosperity in order to reinforce the 
EU‘s smart power. However, he does not offer a ‗one size fits all‘ approach in external 
relations, rather a more flexible approach in enlargement, neighborhood, and third 
countries (pp. 3-4). In short, Olli Rehn‘s view of smart power EU is based on three 
principles: improvement of political agenda, institutional reforms, and defining clear 
foreign policy objectives.  
 The principles to build the structure for the EU based on smart power tools 
proposed by Olli Rehn points out the roadmap for the EU to pursue. In fact, with the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the EU has taken a substantial step 
towards being a smart power in world politics. Although innovations brought by the 
Treaty of Lisbon will be discussed in detail in the second chapter of this study, it is 
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worth mentioning some of the aspects in this section in order to have a strong grasp of 
the argument with regard to EU as a smart power. Since its establishment, the EU has 
attempted to build a more integrated common foreign policy which gained substance 
with the Treaty on European Union in 1992. With regard to defining clear foreign 
policy objectives, introduction of Common Foreign and Security Policy as an 
independent pillar of newly established European Union played an important role. The 
creation of CFSP brought a new understanding to the ways the member states to follow 
a more coordinated foreign policy and further institutionalized foreign policy of the 
Union following the establishment European Political Cooperation in the 1970s. 
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon has brought three major innovations that lead to 
improvement of political agenda and the necessary institutional reforms for a better 
coordination regarding the foreign policies of member states.  
 First major innovation that was introduced with Treaty of Lisbon is the 
introduction of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. Through the newly introduced position, the foreign policy making of 
the Union has gained a foreign policy chief who would facilitate coordination and 
cooperation in this field. Furthermore, the High Representative was given the role to 
chair the Foreign Affairs Council. Before the introduction of High Representative, the 
foreign affairs minister of the country that holds the presidency of the term on the basis 
of rotating presidency used to be the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. Therefore, the 
foreign policy of the Union has gained continuity in contrast to the previous procedure 
and thereby has facilitated the improvement of political agenda. Similarly, with the 
introduction of the new post of President of European Council as the second major 
innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon the political cooperation and integration has gained 
strength through the similar mechanism of providing continuity to the policy making in 
the Union.  
 Finally, with regard to institutional mechanism the Treaty of Lisbon has 
introduced the European External Action Service which shows the EU‘s commitment to 
increase the level of integration in foreign policy making. In fact, the establishment of 
EEAS reveals member states‘ commitment to bind their foreign policies to the EU 
institutions more closely. Since the member states possess the ability to use hard power 
tools and the EU to use soft power tools, the introduction of EEAS would facilitating 
the coordination between soft power and hard power instruments. Furthermore, since 
25 
 
the EU is fundamentally a diplomatic actor, creation of an ‗institution‘ through which 
member states can articulate their interests along with the Union‘s interest represents a 
significant step taken towards more effective improvement of policies and defining 
clearer foreign policy objectives. Therefore, with the Treaty of Lisbon the EU has taken 
an important step towards its aim to become a smart power. The introduction of post of 
High Representative and President of the European Council, and the creation of EEAS 
represent the necessary institutional reform in this field through which the EU would be 
more able to effectively improve policies and define clearer foreign policy objectives.  
 Joseph Nye (2011) also argues that Europe has the capability to become a smart 
power in the global arena. With its total economy and population larger than the US, 
human capital, and technology Europe is the biggest competitor of the US. In military 
terms, as a tool of hard power, the EU spends less than the US but it outnumbers the US 
by its men under arms as well as two countries with nuclear powers. In terms of soft 
power tools, Europe has always been culturally attractive to the rest of the world than 
the US which is often associated with using hard power in foreign affairs. The European 
states also have been an important part of the international institutions. However, the 
EU still faces challenges including the limited competences of the institutions, 
economic crisis of 2008, and declining population of the Union. According to Nye, if 
the EU manages to tackle with these challenges, it has enough means to develop a smart 
power strategy (pp. 158-163).  
 In this regard, the use of sanctions emerges as an important tool of a smart 
power. The aim of economic sanctions is to induce an ‗economic coercion‘ on the target 
state which makes it likely to be located closer to ‗coercion‘ pole of the continuum. 
However, sanctions are still ‗softer‘ means than coercion my military measures, which 
becomes useful when combined with instruments for ‗attraction‘ as in the case of the 
EU. Although the scholarly works that links the EU and smart power concept still 
remain limited in number, it offers an important research area when the increased use of 
sanctions is taken into account. In this sense, the final section of the third chapter will 
go back to this question and aim to answer whether the introduction of sanctions as a 
foreign policy tool in EU‘s relations with the rest of the world has changed the typology 
of the EU as an actor at the global stage.  
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This chapter has presented a general overview of the literature on the 
characterization of the EU‘s power in world politics by following a more chronological 
order of the literature since each argument has built upon the previous one which 
requires a cumulative understanding. The reason for selection a wide range of theories 
in explaining the EU‘s role in world politics stems from the difficulty of how to 
characterize the EU due to its hybrid nature. Furthermore, it helps to provide a more 
thorough understanding of the issue in question. Building on the theoretical arguments 
presented in this chapter, the next chapter explains the development of EU foreign 
policy in order to obtain the knowledge required for the analysis of EU sanctions policy 
practices and how the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has changed EU‘s 
characterization in world politics.  
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CHAPTER II: THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: ON 
THE WAY TO “SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE” 
The development of European foreign policy has been one of the most 
challenging areas of European integration process. Despite all the difficulties 
encountered in more than half a century, Europe has been able to develop a foreign 
policy by moving from an economic entity to a Union with a political and foreign policy 
dimension. Since the 1970s European foreign policy has transformed from being a 
‗gentlemen‘s agreement‘ to operating ―as a political entity in dealing with terrorism, the 
Balkans, the proliferation of weapons, the Middle East peace process, African 
development and many other issues‖ (Cameron, 2007, p. 204). This transformation of 
European foreign policy can be considered as an action-reaction process where the EU 
develops foreign policy as a ‗reaction‘ to the ‗actions‘ take place both in world politics 
and in the Union itself.  
An overview to the development of European foreign policy reveals this path of 
evolution where two most important developments regarding foreign policy followed 
major changes in internal and external contexts. First major step taken in foreign policy 
coordination was the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC) with the 
London Report in 1981. Internally, it can be attributed to the accomplishment of 
integration in other areas. Externally, it was a product of changing global structure 
where there were Arab-Israel War and following Oil Crisis of 1973 and the 
deteriorating relations with the US. These dynamics led the EC to reconsider the 
necessity to raise its voice in world politics as a single entity. Second major step taken 
in foreign policy was the transition from EPC to Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the way to the Treaty of Lisbon. Internally, the developments in the 1990s 
until the Treaty of Lisbon can be considered as a product of the enlargement process of 
the Union. Externally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a huge impact on the 
further integration of the EU. The eastern enlargement of the EU following the demise 
of the Soviet Union led member states to take substantive initiatives towards a more 
coordinated foreign policy. Finally, since the entry into force of the TEU, the EU has 
completed its foreign policy development to a certain extent with the introduction of an 
administrative body for foreign policy, EEAS, and the creation of a post of High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Therefore, the 
development of foreign policy at the EU level can be considered in three phases where 
28 
 
beginning of the phases was marked with major breakthroughs in the history of the EU. 
The empirical part of this study, the development of EU sanctions policy and analysis of 
sanctions imposed up to date, shows consistency with the development of EU foreign 
policy where each phase in the foreign policy integration witnesses use of sanctions 
more frequently.  
Since such a hybrid evolution shapes the characterization of the EU‘s role in 
world politics, analyzing the development of European foreign policy becomes 
inevitable for understanding the EU‘s role in international relations. Towards this aim, 
this chapter presents the evolution of European foreign policy in a chronological order 
by explaining developments internal and external to the EU either obstructing or 
facilitating the process. Before proceeding explaining the evolution of European foreign 
policy, it is worth mentioning that although this chapter focuses on the development of 
EU foreign policy in general, other areas of integration are sometimes referred due to 
intertwined nature of the EU integration process.  
 
Background: Early Steps in European Integration Process 
 
 In 1950, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, presented the 
French proposal to Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) for the 
creation of a common High Authority for French and German coal and steel. According 
to Schuman Plan, which is prepared by French diplomat Jean Monnet, authorities of 
France and FRG on these respective industries would be under the control of a 
supranational entity. Although this first step towards European integration seemed to 
have mainly an economic aspect, it was also political for the founding fathers of the EU. 
According to Schuman, ―the pooling of coal and steel production should immediately 
provide for the setting up of a common foundation for economic development as a first 
step in the federation of Europe‖ (Schuman cited in Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 
2003, p. 38).  
 One year after the Schuman Plan, the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was founded with the signing of the Paris Treaty by France, FRG, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. It was a revolutionary event in the sense that 
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European states decided to solve their problems by cooperation rather than long-lasting 
conflicts on the continent and they agreed on the rules based on international order and 
multilateralism. Referring back to Cooper‘s argument, with the establishment of ECSC 
the European states have transformed their relations to be built on Kantian principles 
rather than living in the Hobbesian world where ‗war of all against all‘ is the prominent 
rule. According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2003), emphasis on the rules based on 
international order and multilateralism would become the main standing stone of 
European foreign policy (p. 38).  
 Although Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, as supporters of a federal Europe, 
emphasized the political dimension of integration process, hardly any progress was 
accomplished in the name of creating a common foreign policy for Europe. In the 
following years, there were two developments which were not very effective because of 
different reasons. Germany was left disarmed after the Second World War against any 
possible future aggression. While the negotiations for the Schuman Plan were taking 
place, German rearmament was a great question in the minds of political decision 
makers. The solution proposed by France, which is known as Pleven Plan, suggested the 
creation of a European army with a European Minister for Defense under the control of 
a Council of foreign ministers of member states. In 1952, the Six signed the European 
Defense Community (EDC) Treaty which was subject to ratification of national 
parliaments. Although France was the proposer of the Plan, the Treaty was rejected by 
the French parliament and EDC became a stillborn initiation towards creating a foreign 
and defense policy (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 41).  
 Upon the failure of the EDC, the question about German rearmament remained 
unresolved. Another alternative solution was proposed by English foreign secretary 
Anthony Eden with the support of the US. In 1954, several agreements were signed 
such as FRG‘s membership to NATO, Italian and German membership in the Brussels 
Pact, and the creation of Western European Union (WEU). However, creation of a 
defense dimension for Europe remained a problematic issue for the following years 
(Bindi, 2010, p. 14).  
 Although the steps taken towards the creation of a common foreign policy were 
unfruitful, the following years witnessed the well-functioning of the ECSC on its agreed 
terms. However, member states realized that integration only in coal and steel sectors 
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would not be effective in the future. As a result, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
member states held a conference at Messina, Italy in 1955 where they agreed on ―the 
establishment of a united Europe by the development of common institutions, the 
progressive fusion of national economies, the creation of a common market, and the 
progressive harmonization of their social policies‖ (Messina Resolution, cited in 
Weigall and Stirk, 1992, p. 94). Upon the agreement at Messina Conference, the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) was founded with the signing of the two Treaties of Rome in 1957. Treaties 
did not mention any foreign policy initiative which meant that while deeper integration 
was taking place considering the economies of the member states, development of a 
European foreign policy remained as a big question mark.  
 
The 1960s: Charles de Gaulle‟s Stamp on European Affairs 
 
 Throughout the 1960s, there were several attempts that can be characterized as 
unsuccessful as European states to coordinate their foreign policies. In this decade, 
General Charles de Gaulle, who returned to power in France in 1958, put his stamp on 
European affairs. De Gaulle supported coordination among foreign policies of member 
states but his views on Europe had a contradictory nature. While he was in favor of a 
―European Europe‖ which was to be powerful enough to counterbalance the US and 
Soviet Union, he supported the idea that states should keep their full sovereignty. 
According to Federiga Bindi (2010), ―this contradiction came to characterize the French 
approach to the process of European integration and constitutes one of the major 
contradictions of a European foreign policy today‖ (p. 16).  
 In 1959, Charles de Gaulle initiated a European policy aimed at the creation of a 
political authority under which political and foreign policy cooperation would be 
institutionalized. Not surprisingly, the institutional mechanism was to be based on 
intergovernmental structure which would run independent of the Brussels-based 
institutions of the Community and it would be established in Paris. The mechanism was 
to operate by regular meetings of the foreign ministers of the Six to discuss the foreign 
policy agendas. With this foreign policy cooperation, France aimed at development of 
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policies by Europe, not by the US, both in domestic and international affairs (H. Smith, 
2002, pp. 48-49).  
 The first meeting of foreign ministers took place in January 1960 and it became 
the backbone of European foreign policy which is known as CAGRE (the Conseil 
Affaires Générales et Relations Extérieures). In the meantime, de Gaulle did not give up 
his idea about the regular meetings at the level of heads of states and governments. The 
result was the Paris summit, held on February 1961, which was the antecedent of 
European Council. However, this did not mean that the member states fully agreed with 
de Gaulle‘s proposals. The Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns, rejected the idea of 
regular meetings at the level of heads of states and governments (Bindi, p. 16).  
 As a result of Dutch foreign minister‘s rejection, the EEC leaders decided to 
establish a committee under French ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet, whose 
responsibility was to write proposals for political cooperation. The report prepared by 
Fouchet Committee, known as Fouchet Plan, proposed the creation of a union of states 
which to follow a common foreign and defense policy independent of NATO. The plan 
suggested the development of an autonomous European institutional infrastructure and 
establishment of a council at the level of heads of states and governments to meet four 
times in a year. In order to implement the Council decisions, creation of a political 
committee consists of foreign ministry representatives of the Six was proposed (Malici, 
2008, p. 8). According to Kernic (2006), the Fouchet Plan, though not being explicit, 
based on the idea of placing Europe in a triangle along with the US and the Soviet 
Union (p. 11). However, in the Cold War atmosphere, this led to reluctance among 
European governments who, at the end, preferred placing themselves under the NATO 
umbrella. Further, the idea of an independent foreign policy and establishing concrete 
institutions increased their reluctance on this issue (Malici, p. 9).  
In the period between 1959 and 1963, besides the internal problems, the foreign 
ministers had an agenda for discussion about different international problems such as 
the Congo crisis and Cuban missile crisis. However, these meetings remained only as 
discussions without any solution or contribution because of more fundamental and 
deeper internal problems of the EEC on the possible ways and the extent of cooperation 
(H. Smith, p. 49). In the following years, the EEC focused on its internal problems 
which were mainly the crisis stemmed from French insistence on creating Common 
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) and French veto to Britain‘s membership application in 1963 
(Nicoll & Salmon, 2001, p. 346).  
 
The Luxembourg Compromise: Solution to Internal Deadlock 
 
 De Gaulle‘s contradictory view on the European integration led to an internal 
deadlock in the Communities in mid-1960s. He was in favor of cooperation in foreign 
policy but he strongly rejected the idea of increasing competence of the institutions. In 
this regard, he rejected participation of France in any of the Community decision-
making structures for six months in 1965-1966 which led to a deadlock in decision-
making process. The solution to be found for this problem was called Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966 which made member states‘ authorities equal in decision-making 
capacities with the European Commission on all issues. When the Six managed to 
merge the institutions under a single roof and became to be known as European 
Communities (EC) with the Merger Treaty in 1967, the new European Commission was 
left unable to initiate any proposal for a European foreign policy (H. Smith, p. 50).  
 1967 witnessed another attempt by de Gaulle with the aim of revival of the 
intergovernmental political and foreign policy cooperation at the Rome Summit. The 
proposal of French government remained the same with the previous one, by suggesting 
regular meetings of foreign ministers to discuss foreign policy issues such as the Middle 
East crisis and the division of Germany. The antagonist member state of the Summit 
against the proposal was the Netherlands again, by arguing the importance of Britain‘s 
involvement in these political cooperation negotiations. The result of the Summit was a 
failure for taking a step towards cooperation in foreign policy, the member states only 
agreed that political and foreign policy cooperation could take place when 
circumstances were appropriate for such an action (H. Smith, p. 51).  
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The Hague Summit, 1969: An Important Step towards Further Integration 
 
 At the end of 1960s, the EC encountered a new environment of changing 
domestic and international context. Internationally, the Cold War was approaching its 
detente years and the question of the US‘ commitment to Europe remained intact. 
Internally, West German Chancellor was replaced by Willy Brandt whose foreign 
policy agenda was rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the end of de Gaulle era 
paved the way for initiation of new European policies (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, p. 
44). 
 With the effect of changing internal and external environment, French President 
Georges Pompidou, successor of General de Gaulle, initiated The Hague Summit in 
1969. He stated in the conference that: 
 
―…at a time, as we all know, the superpowers – the Soviet Union, but also 
the United States – view European problems as they affect their own 
interests, and cannot but view them thus, we owe it to our peoples to revive 
their hopes of seeing Europe in control of its destiny. It was because of this 
and with this idea in mind that I suggested calling this conference whose 
outcome will condition not only the Community’s future, but also the future 
policy of each of the nations assembled here‖ (Pompidou, 1969). 
 
 Therefore, The Hague Summit started with three important issues on the agenda 
which were enlargement, economic and monetary union, and political union later 
became to be known as Pompidou‘s Triptique (Bindi, p. 18). A new possibility emerged 
after de Gaulle was the prospect of membership to new states. In this respect, accession 
negotiations with the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway started 
(Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, p. 44) and foreign ministers were assigned ―to study the 
best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification‖ (The Hague 
Summit Declaration). For economic and monetary union, The Hague Summit 
Declaration identified the establishment of the Common Market as ―the way for a united 
Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world (The Hague Summit 
Declaration).   
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Besides the introduction of the enlargement process and preparation of strategies 
for economic and monetary union, the political unification leg of the Triptique 
emphasized the introduction of strategies for a ‗united Europe‘ which would strengthen 
its stance and mission in world politics (Malici, p. 9). Despite being ambiguous, the 
concept of political union suggested introduction of a method where Community 
institutions can be put in a more coordinated structure for an effective decision-making 
process (H. Smith, p. 66). The institutional mechanism for political unification called a 
series of biannual meetings among foreign ministers and officials. The results of these 
meetings were declarations and suggestive procedures for coordination in political and 
foreign affairs but they were not binding for member states. Further, the idea of 
cooperation included only foreign policy issues by leaving out common defense policy. 
Despite these limitations, The Hague Summit was an important initiative and served as 
a precursor of further integration in foreign policy among member states (Malici, p. 9).  
 
The 1970s: First Breakthrough – Establishment of European Political  
       Cooperation (EPC) 
 
First Enlargement: Europe of „the Nine‟ 
 
 After The Hague summit, the process of European unification has started. First, 
accession negotiations with the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway started in 1970. The 
accession treaty with the UK, Ireland, and Denmark was signed in 1972 and they 
became members of the Community in 1973. The negotiations were completed 
successfully with Norway, but Norwegian membership to EC was vetoed by its 
respective public in a referendum. From then on, the EC became to be known as the 
―Europe of the Nine‖ (Bindi, p. 19). As a second part of Triptique, member states 
started negotiations on how to set up a monetary union in 1970 and a committee to be 
responsible for creating the structure was formed under the authority of Pierre Werner. 
Member states perceived the monetary union as the ideal tool for further integration 
(Mockli, p. 38).  
 There were developments regarding the political union as well. At the beginning 
of the 1970s, the member states of the EC started to feel the international pressure 
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increasingly about foreign policy cooperation (Kernic, p. 12). In this period, the 
escalating crisis between the Arabs and Israel in the Middle East and resulting oil crisis, 
and the Vietnam War put the responsibility on the EC‘s shoulders for further 
engagement in integration process (Bindi, pp. 20-21). With these developments, the EC 
decided to engage in foreign policy cooperation because member states wanted to show 
their political weight in world affairs, rather than being only an ‗economic giant‘. From 
then on, the EC engaged in series of attempts to establish a coordination system for 
creating a foreign policy (Cameron, 2007, p. 24). In this respect, the Belgian Political 
Director Vicomte Davignon was appointed by the foreign ministers of member states at 
the beginning of 1970 to draft a report which would include the ways how a new system 
could be achieved in foreign policy cooperation (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 347).  
 
The Luxembourg Report and European Political Cooperation 
  
The report prepared by Davignon was approved by the member states at the 
Luxembourg Conference of Foreign Ministers on 27 October 1970, and it became 
known officially as the ‗Luxembourg Report‘. The Luxembourg Report marked the 
beginning of a significant process which is called European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
based on an intergovernmental structure. In the Report, there was a strong emphasis on 
the need to ―intensify political cooperation‖ and to ―concentrate specifically on the 
coordination of foreign policies in order to show the whole world that Europe has a 
political mission‖. According to the Report, the role of this political mission was to 
―promote the relaxation of international tension and the rapprochement among all 
peoples, and first and foremost among those of the entire European continent‖ 
(Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, p. 44). Although there was the emphasis of ―the entire 
European continent‖, the membership to EC was open only to the states which were 
democratic with freely elected parliaments. According to H. Smith (2002), this 
emphasis refers to a specific philosophical and normative commitment by the member 
states which suggests the consolidation and expansion of liberal democratic values in 
Europe (p. 68).  
The objectives of the foreign policy cooperation were defined as follows: ―to 
ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual 
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understanding on the great international problems; to strengthen their solidarity by 
promoting the harmonization of their views, the coordination of their positions and, 
where it appears possible and desirable; common actions‖ (Hill & Smith, 2003, p. 77). 
In order to reach these objectives, EPC established certain mechanisms such as biannual 
meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to discuss foreign policy. The meetings were 
to be chaired by the foreign minister of the country providing the President of the 
Council of European Communities. These meetings were to be prepared by the Political 
Committee consisted of senior officials from the foreign offices of member states. A 
group of European correspondents who were a junior group of officials were assigned to 
assist the Political Committee. A telegraphic system was established to exchange 
diplomatic messages among officials which known as COREU, for ‗Correspondant 
Européen‘ (Cameron, pp. 24-25).  
EPC marked a significant step reflecting the will to create a common European 
foreign policy. According to Ifestos (1987), The Hague Summit and the creation of EPC 
was a ―conjectural turnover period, dominated by an optimistic and creative atmosphere 
about the future prospects of European integration.‖ The common actions would be one 
of the most important tools in relations with the rest of the world in the following years 
(p. 151). However, the EC was still far away from reaching its objectives on the way to 
unification of foreign policies. For example, the objectives of EPC were very cautious 
because the member states only referred to sharing information and consultation on ―the 
major issues of international politics‖ (H. Smith, p. 68). Furthermore, France, with the 
legacy of the failure of Fouchet Plan, rejected involvement of the Community 
institutions which disabled the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of 
Justice to play any role in EPC. Therefore, the EPC‘s aim was reduced to provide 
consultation, coordination, and cooperation among member states‘ foreign policies 
rather than creating a common foreign policy. In this respect, the issues discussed in the 
context of EPC remained limited. For instance, foreign policy towards the former 
colonies was not included in EPC (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, p. 46). Relations with 
the former colonies remained as agreed with the Yaoundé Convention which was signed 
in 1963 (Bindi, p. 16). Furthermore, external developments which pushed Europeans 
together for foreign policy coordination created centrifugal pressures on the states to 
find a solution by themselves alone (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 348). As a result of the nature 
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of EPC and its relative ineffectiveness, member states of the EC continued their 
attempts for creating a common foreign policy in the following years.  
 Despite its ineffectiveness, the EPC did not die and became the precursor of 
Common and Foreign Policy (CFSP) which to be established in 1992. The governments 
of member states were eager to discuss the next steps to be taken for the development of 
EPC in accordance with the provisions of the Luxembourg Report. As a result, they 
held a summit in Paris in 1972 to discuss the progress reached in foreign policy 
cooperation (Hill & Smith, p. 80). The decisions reached at the Paris Summit was 
important in the sense that it showed the cooperation would be likely to intensify in the 
future although there was no significant progress until the Summit. Member states 
recognized the Commission as a necessary partner for further cooperation. As a result, 
an important prospect was opened for involvement of the Community institutions in the 
process of creating a common foreign policy at the Paris Summit (H. Smith, p. 72).  
 
The Copenhagen Report and Declaration on European Identity, 1973 
 
 In July 1973, under the guidance of Davignon, foreign ministers of member 
states completed the Copenhagen Report stating the ways to enhance the cooperation in 
foreign policy. According to the Copenhagen Report, the main objectives of EPC were 
to: 
―…ensure by means of regular consultations and exchanges of information, 
improved mutual understanding as regards the main problems of 
international relations; to strengthen solidarity between governments by 
promoting the harmonization of their views and the alignment of their 
positions and, wherever it appears possible and desirable, joint action.‖ 
(The Copenhagen Report, 1973) 
The overall aim was, again, to alter the attitudes of member states towards foreign 
policy coordination despite the lack of a supranational authority (Hill & Smith, p. 83). 
Therefore, the Copenhagen Report further institutionalized the changes in the role of 
Community institutions in EPC‘s decision-making process. The aspect where the 
Copenhagen Report was different from the Luxembourg Report was the lack of a 
comprehensive philosophical framework (H. Smith, pp. 73-74).  
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The major reason for this absence was the strained relations with the US. The 
relations between the EC and the US started to deteriorate in the late 1960s. In the 
1970s, the US experienced a deficit in the balance of payments and held the EC 
responsible. Later, the US started to see the EC as an important economic competitor. 
From then on, the US supported the idea of the EC should contribute more to NATO 
expenses while the US would remain as the leader of the organization. The 
disagreements between the EC and the US were also evident on Vietnam War and on 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the resulting Oil Crisis. In 1973, the EC agreed on a 
common view about the legitimate rights of the Palestinians which was opposed by the 
US (Bindi, p. 21). 
In April 1973, Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, argued that, beyond 
economic cooperation, there was a need for development of political and defense 
relationship between the EC and the US (H. Smith, p. 76). This American call is best 
represented by Kissinger‘s statement that ―we want to speak to them but they do not 
have a phone number.‖ This statement pointed out the lack of cohesion among 
European states about the important developments in world politics (Nicoll & Salmon, 
p. 348). According to H. Smith (2002), this aim would have been acceptable to EC if 
the US did not place the Europeans as a ―junior partner‖ which would be responsible for 
merely regional issues. This situation dragged the EC into a dilemma which the Nine 
perceived the necessity to balance the US demands with their will to have an 
independent existence in world affairs (p. 77).  
As a result of this dilemma, the Nine adopted the Copenhagen Declaration of 
European Identity which was the EC‘s first attempt after the EPC to identify European 
interests and relations with the rest of the world. The Declaration aimed to specify the 
general principles which would guide the EC‘s international relations and its 
development in the future. The emphasis was put on broader concepts and values such 
as interdependence, representative democracy, and rule of law, social justice, and 
human rights (M. Smith, p. 136). The Declaration on European Identity touched upon 
two important issues. First, by focusing on these values, the EC agreed to construct its 
relations with third countries on a harmonious and constructive basis (Lodge, 1989, p. 
229). Therefore, the prerequisite for membership to the EC were defined as to share the 
same ‗ideals and objectives‘ for other European states who want to become a member in 
the future (H. Smith, p. 77).  
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Second, the Declaration on European Identity stated that the relations between 
EPC and the US should not have any effect on the EC‘s attempts to found a distinct and 
original identity while they recognized the significance of the US for European security 
(Peterson & Sjursen, 1998, p. 182). It was clearly indicated by the Declaration as: 
 
―European Unification is not directed against anyone, nor is it inspired by a 
desire for power. On the contrary, the Nine are convinced that their union 
will benefit the whole international community… The Nine intend to play an 
active role in world affairs and thus to contribute, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, to ensuring that 
international relations have a more just basis; that prosperity is more 
equitably shared; and that the security of each country is more effectively 
guaranteed. In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should progressively 
define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy.‖ (Declaration on 
European Identity, 1973) 
 
The Gymnich Agreement, 1974: Reconciliation with the US 
 
Although the Declaration on the European Identity was an important step in 
defining the common values must be adopted by the future member states and the 
EEC‘s willingness to ‗speak with one voice‘, it did not bring a permanent solution to 
the relations with the US. When the EC‘s engagement in the Euro-Arab dialogue in 
1974 faced a harsh reaction from the US, the Nine urged for a solution to the 
relations with the US. This process was challenging for the EC due to the 
disagreements among the member states. The new government in the UK under 
James Callaghan adopted a radical view on this issue and defended the American 
point of view which demanded a right to have a say on the EPC decisions. Callaghan 
stated that the UK would not take any action with the member states without 
bilaterally consulting to the US (Mockli, p. 316).  
Federal Republic of Germany, the president of EPC of the time, tried to reach 
a balance between the US and the UK demands while retaining the autonomy of 
EPC. FRG proposed the idea of an informal meeting of the foreign ministers of 
member states at a castle near Bonn called Gymnich. Pressure from both sides 
revealed the fact that reaching a concrete general agreement would be difficult 
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(Mockli, pp. 317-318). Therefore, they focused on the idea of an informal agreement 
instead of an official written agreement. German foreign minister Hans Dietrich 
Genscher identified the agreement as a ‗gentlemen‘s agreement‘ (Nuttall, 1992, p. 
91). The agreement was stated by Genscher as:  
 
―…concerning the question of consultations of the Nine with allied or 
friendly states by means of the presidency, ministers have agreed to proceed 
in a pragmatic and case-by-case fashion. Where one of the partners raises 
the question of informing and consulting an allied or friendly state, the Nine 
will discuss the matter and will, after consensus has been reached, request 
the Presidency to proceed accordingly‖ (Genscher cited in Mockli, p. 319).  
 
In other words, the agreement was reached by acceptance of the US as a 
special case in EC‘s relations among third parties. The US was to be consulted in the 
context of EPC but it would have no right to have a seat at the EPC table. In order to 
prevent the US to have bilateral meetings with the member states, the Presidency was 
assigned for consulting on behalf of other member states (Hill & Smith, p. 97). 
Although the agreement was unwritten, it formed the basis of EC and the US 
political consultations in the following years (H. Smith, p. 79). 
According to Mockli (2009), the importance of the Gymnich Agreement 
reflects itself in two different dimensions. First, by the Gymnich Agreement the EC 
solved the EPC‘s most challenging pressure from international environment. As a 
result, the Nine guaranteed the existence of EPC in the upcoming years. However, 
they had to pay a cost which referred to the removal of any issue from the EPC 
agenda in the situations where the consultations with the US failed. From this 
dimension, the Gymnich Agreement revealed the ―subordination of European 
interests to US leadership‖ which would lead the absence of independent common 
policies of the EC. Although, in practice, the Gymnich Agreement had a limited role 
due to some member states‘ non-compliance, it revealed the shift from ‗European 
dreams‘ to the US demands in Europe‘s relations with the rest of the world (pp. 319-
321). 
 
 
41 
 
The Paris Summit, 1974: Establishment of European Council 
 
 Although the EPC was severely affected by the problematic relations with the 
US in 1973, the ad-hoc summits of the EC continued to push the process forward. 
With the recognized necessity to put EPC an international weight, the heads of states 
and governments held a summit in Paris upon the invitation of French President 
Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing (Hill & Smith, p. 99). The discussions of the leaders 
mainly focused on the establishment of an intergovernmental institution which would 
regularize the meetings of the heads of states and governments as to be taken place 
three times a year. France was in favor of a limited participation as including only 
the heads of states and governments. However, this proposal was rejected by the 
other member states and it was decided to include foreign ministers and the President 
of the Commission in order to assist the heads of states and governments (Bulmer & 
Wessels, 1987, p. 33).  
 In order to achieve ‗European unity‘, the European Council was to ―ensure 
progress and overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and in the work 
on political cooperation.‖ In order to achieve these goals, the European Council 
would try to ―adopt common positions and coordinate their diplomatic action in all 
areas of international affairs which affect the interests of the European Community.‖ 
The President in Office would be the spokesman of the member states (The Paris 
Communiqué, 1974). Despite being intergovernmental in nature, the European 
Parliament was given a role to ask questions to the foreign ministers which remained 
as a small effort in order to increase the involvement of the Community institutions 
(H. Smith, p. 79).  
The Paris Summit was important in several aspects. First, the establishment 
of the European Council, which would deal with both Community and EPC issues, 
put an end to the practice of foreign ministers meeting in different places even on the 
same day (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 348). Another significant aspect reflected by the Paris 
Summit was the blurred lines between the Community and foreign policy 
competencies. According to H. Smith (2002), the inclusion of the Commission 
President in the European Council only four years after the decision on the exclusion 
of Commission from non-treaty issues at the Luxembourg Report represented a 
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contradiction. Furthermore, the involvement of the European Parliament revealed the 
nested nature of the treaty and non-treaty issues (p. 80). Although the European 
Council did not become an institution of the Community until 2000s, it was 
institutionalized within its own context in the following years (M. Smith, p. 98).  
 
The Tindemans Report, 1976: Too Ambitious for the Time 
 
Already at the Paris Summit in 1972, the member states requested preparation 
of regular reports on the ‗European Union‘ by the Community institutions including 
the Commission, the Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the Economic 
and Social Committee. At the Paris Summit in 1974, they invited Leo Tindemans, 
Prime Minister of Belgium, to present a comprehensive report on the basis of those 
prepared by the Community institutions before the end of 1975 (Ifestos, pp. 192-
193). There were several reports prepared but the Nine demanded to bring them all 
together and Tindemans, who was in favor of a deeper integration, was willing to 
take a leap forward towards this aim (Hill & Smith, p. 99). Leo Tindemans defined 
the objective given to him as ―to define what was meant by the term ‗European 
Union‘‖ (Tindemans cited in Gilbert, 2003, p. 103).  
Tindemans was cautious about not being too ambitious and he tried to use the 
arts of politics as possible (Hill & Smith, p. 99). Therefore, the Report did not aim to 
achieve a federal Europe yet it turned out that the wills for the future of Europe 
presented by the Report was ahead of its time (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 348). For 
Tindemans, ―European Union implies that we represent a united front to the outside 
world. We must tend to act in common in all the main fields of external relations 
whether in foreign policy, security, economic relations or development aid‖ (the 
Tindemans Report, 1976). One of the revolutionary proposals of Tindemans was the 
abolishment of the dual structure which implied different ministerial meetings for EC 
and EPC. According to him, ―in order to decide on a policy the Ministers must be 
able to consider all aspects of the problems within the Council‖ (the Tindemans 
Report, 1976). 
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In the same context, the Tindemans Report also proposed the establishment of 
legal obligations for member states in order to ensure foreign policy cooperation. 
These legal obligations would include common policies as competencies in treaty-
based Community areas (H. Smith, p. 81). By doing so, the coordination of national 
positions would become under the guarantee of law which in turn would enhance the 
EPC decision-making process (M. Smith, p. 122). To this end, ―the minority must 
rally to the views of majority at the conclusion of a debate‖ (the Tindemans Report, 
1976). This proposal implied that ―the European Court of Justice be given 
jurisdiction over all aspects of Union decision-making – including foreign policy‖ 
(H. Smith, p. 81).  
Tindemans also urged for the necessity that Europe should play a significant 
role in the ‗new world economic order‘. The Report suggested that the way to 
advance monetary integration was to allow the countries that were strong enough to 
push for economic and monetary union. Furthermore, according to the Report, the 
European Council was to coordinate the internal monetary policies and budget 
policies of member states. In the context of ‗social and human dimension‘, 
Tindemans suggested the introduction of European passport, free movement of 
people, exchange of students, and improvement of educational policies across 
member countries (Gilbert, p. 104).  
However, the Tindemans Report was rejected by the member states because 
of its ‗too demanding‘ proposals (M. Smith, p. 122). In 1976 European Council, the 
member states decided ―to exercise their sovereignty in a progressively convergent 
manner as regards political cooperation‖ (Ifestos, p. 197). They only agreed on the 
continuation of annual reports from the foreign ministers and the Commission about 
the progress towards the European Union (H. Smith, p. 81). According to Hill and 
Smith (2000), the Tindemans Report ―had caught the down slope, not the crest, of the 
wave of enthusiasm which had characterized the EC in the early 1970s‖ (p. 100).  
The failure of Tindemans Report revealed the immature atmosphere for the 
development of political integration due to internal divisions and disagreements in 
the 1970s which would continue to dominate European politics in the decade to 
follow. Another result derived from this refusal was that the EPC would continue to 
be a ‗pragmatic‘ and ‗realistic‘ forum for foreign policy discussions among the 
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member states. At the time, the prospect of common foreign policy seemed as a 
possibility for the future although the practices had been proved inefficient so far 
(Ifestos, p. 198).  
 
Other Developments in the 1970s: the Community of Twelve 
 
 While the EC was trying to balance the relations with the US and engaging in 
attempts for developing foreign policy coordination, dictatorship regimes ended in 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain. In 1974, the regime of colonels came to an end in 
Greece and the same year also witnessed the Carnation Revolution in Portugal which 
overthrew Antonio Salazar from power. Spain also started its transformation towards 
a democratic regime with the death of Franco in 1975. These three countries in 
transformation lost no time for applying the EC membership. There was no choice 
for the EC, which defined the prerequisites for membership with the Declaration on 
European Identity, to reject these new democracies which needed guidance for 
political and economic development. France considered the application of Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain as a chance to re-balance the EC towards the center (Bindi, pp. 
22-23). 
Greece had already applied for membership in the late 1950s but it was 
rejected on the basis of its underdeveloped economy. It was still characterized by 
poor economic performance such as low wages, high inflation rates, and 
underdeveloped industrial sectors. However, with French insistence, the Nine 
decided that membership would facilitate Greek attempts to democratize. As a result, 
the accession talks started in 1976 and Greece became a member of the EC in 1981. 
Spanish and Portuguese economic records were similar to Greece and this situation 
created reluctance among the member states. Feeling the same responsibility, the EC 
started negotiations with Portugal and Spain in 1978 and 1979 respectively. 
However, the process for Portugal and Spain took longer time and they became full 
members of the EC in 1986 (McCormick & Olsen, 2014, pp. 66-67). 
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The 1980s: Focusing on Internal Dynamics 
 
With the second enlargement the member states of the EC were doubled since 
its inception which had several economic and political consequences. The geography 
and structure of the EC changed; it became the largest economic bloc in the world, 
the decision-making process became more complicated, and the internal economic 
structure was changed by the inclusion of poorer Mediterranean countries. In order to 
re-arrange the internal structure, the EC focused more on deepening by initiating 
reforms on the internal market (McCormick & Olsen, p. 67).  
 
The London Report, 1981: Completion of European Political Cooperation 
  
The London Report was the third report which established and codified the 
EPC along with the Luxembourg Report and the Copenhagen Report (Hill & Smith, 
p. 114). The proposal to prepare a report on EPC came from the UK who had been 
cautious about further integration of the EC. The main reason for British interest was 
the EPC‘s inability to react Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Iranian 
hostage crisis. Lord Carrington, British Foreign Secretary, criticized the slow and 
uncoordinated structure of EPC and called for a consultation mechanism which 
would serve in times of crises. This proposal was of a pragmatic character 
introducing practical improvements which did not foresee any changes in the 
intergovernmental structure of the EPC (Nutall, 1992, p. 175). 
The proposal of Lord Carrington composed of four different dimensions: 
political commitment, institutional structure, crisis consultation, and security. First, 
the Report urged member states to find ways for closer cooperation and commitment 
of their national policies to the objectives of EPC. As stated in the London Report 
―…the need for a coherent and united approach to international affairs by the 
members of the European Community is greater than ever…the Ten should seek 
increasingly to shape events and not merely to react to them‖ (The London Report, 
1981). Second, creation of an institutional mechanism which would strengthen the 
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EPC was proposed. This institutional mechanism was to be composed of experienced 
foreign policy staff which would assist the President-in-office (Ifestos, p. 296).  
Third, meetings for consultation were to take place in times of crises within 
forty-eight hours upon the request of three member states. The Report stated that 
member states ―emphasize their commitment to consult partners before adopting 
final positions or launching national initiatives on all important questions of foreign 
policy which are of concern to the Ten as a whole‖ (The London Report, 1981). Last 
but not the least, security was mentioned for the first time as a concern of the EPC. 
As stated in the report ―…the Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the flexible and 
pragmatic approach which has made it possible to discuss in Political Cooperation 
certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of 
security‖ (The London Report, 1981).  
Although the London Report focused on four different dimensions, the major 
change in the structure of the EPC was the introduction of ‗Troika‘ which included 
the previous and successor foreign ministers to support the President-in-office. With 
regard to political commitment, although the discourse was stronger than the 
previous two reports it was still political commitment without a legal basis. 
Therefore, the member states did not feel obliged to commit themselves to the agreed 
objectives. Furthermore, the agreement on the security dimension proved to be 
ineffective because of the wording of the Report which kept it at the minimum level 
(Ifestos, pp. 294-295). According to H. Smith (2002) ―there was no radical change in 
ideas developed at Luxembourg and Copenhagen and merely some fine-tuning of the 
diplomatic apparatus‖ (p. 82).  
 
The Genscher-Colombo Initiative, 1981 and Solemn Declaration on European 
Union, 1983 
 
 The London Report, with its pragmatic and minimalist approach, was able to 
bring only modest changes. However, its procedural approach did not appeal to 
German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who made a speech in 1981 
calling for further progress towards European Union. In his speech, he stated that if 
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Europe wanted to have an effective foreign policy, it should show its willingness and 
capacity towards this end. Genscher‘s initiative was launched as Foreign Minister 
and party leader which did not include the Federal Government as a whole. 
Therefore, Genscher sought support from abroad which was provided by Italian 
Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo. Colombo made a speech in 1981 where he took a 
similar approach with Genscher. He also called for going further on the path to 
European Union by developing a European cultural policy and by strengthening 
political cooperation on the basis of day-to-day management (Nutall, pp. 183-185).  
 The public announcement of Genscher-Colombo Initiative occurred in 
January 1981 where Genscher pointed out the shortcomings of Monnet‘s 
evolutionary approach to Europe by arguing that it is ‗illusory‘ to hope reaching a 
political union through further economic integration. According to him, the problems 
of Community could not be solved without ―a definite political dimension‖ (Burgess, 
2000, pp. 134-135). In line with Genscher‘s talk, the concerns of the Initiative were 
mainly policy development, institutional improvement, and adjusting the relationship 
between the EC and EPC (McAllister, 1997, p. 150). The core of the Initiative was 
the idea for an amalgamated common foreign policy including a security dimension 
(H. Smith, p. 85). The aim was to direct the attention of the member states to defense 
area from issues such as money and institutions. Cultural cooperation and cultural 
identity was also seen as other important areas of policy. In addition, adopting a 
common action regarding law and order was another highly-stressed area which later 
was to build the third pillar of 1992 Treaty on European Union (Hill & Smith, p. 
120). The Initiative also included proposals for a more well-defined role for the 
European Council. Increased powers for the European Parliament were emphasized 
but in practice this proposal sought for a modest change (McAllister, p. 157). 
The Genscher-Colombo Initiative was an important step for Europe‘s future 
because it raised some questions directed at the heart of the process of European 
integration. However, the Genscher-Colombo Initiative failed to achieve its objectives 
because of successive rebuttals of European Council and relative inactiveness of the 
European Commission (Burgess, p. 136). Burgess (2000) argues that the Genscher-
Colombo Initiative with foreign and security policy at its core was one version of de 
Gaulle‘s ―Political Union‖. However, as its predecessors the Genscher-Colombo 
Initiative was a reflection of intergovernmental Europe because it lacked the necessary 
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support from the heads of states and governments who had different priorities at the 
time. Due to these obstacles, the Initiative was reduced to the status of ―Solemn 
Declaration‖ in June 1983 (p. 138).  
The Solemn Declaration on European Union was a weakened soft version of 
Genscher-Colombo Initiative specifically in issues regarding the proposals where any 
member state had a ―vital interest‖. Therefore, the Declaration did not include any 
major change either in substance or in procedure of the process towards reaching 
foreign policy cooperation. Ireland, Greece, and Denmark specifically objected to 
introduction of any Community competence to the area of security policy. One major 
difference from the London Report was that foreign ministers were to discuss 
political and economic aspects of security rather than discussing only political 
aspects (H. Smith, p. 86).  
 
European Parliament Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 1984 
 
 Upon being directly elected for the first time in 1979, the European 
Parliament felt itself responsible to move the cause of European integration forward. 
The initiator of this movement was Altiero Spinelli who was a strong federalist in 
favor of strengthening European Parliament by transcending national and party 
divisions. According to Spinelli, the past thirty years of European integration hardly 
achieved a progress because of the strong hand of heads of states and governments. 
In this respect, his aim was to establish a system where the decisions can be taken on 
the level of public and national parliaments rather than the heads of states and 
governments (Nuttall, p. 239).  
 In order to reach these objectives, Spinelli worked with governments who 
were also disappointed about the integration process, particularly FDR and Italy (Hill 
& Smith, p. 133). The proposals included in the Draft Treaty suggested a 
constitutional change that would bring the treaty-based institutions and procedures 
together with EPC and European Council. The Draft Treaty also offered a legal 
personality to European Union and an increase in the supranational method vis-à-vis 
intergovernmental cooperation (H. Smith, p. 87). Spinelli proposed a three-layered 
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structure for decision making for the Union. The first one was supranational where 
the decisions were to be reached at the Union level. The second was introduced for 
policy areas where both Union and Member States would be responsible together. 
The last layer for the decision making procedure would be exercised under the 
authority of member states. Foreign policy was included in this intergovernmental 
layer and no transfer of sovereignty was proposed by the Draft Treaty. Therefore, the 
intergovernmental nature of EPC was preserved but the prospect for future change 
was open in case of member states demanded to change (Nuttall, p. 240).  
 The Draft Treaty was accepted by the Parliament in 1984 with 237 votes 
against 32. The Treaty offered an evolutionary way to European Union without 
touching the key areas in which member states were reluctant since the inception of 
the Community. As a result, the nature of the Draft Treaty implied the continuation 
of intergovernmental character of foreign policy cooperation. Yet, the main ideas of 
the Draft Treaty constituted an important part of the Single European Act to be 
signed two years after the Draft Treaty or the later Treaty on European Union (H. 
Smith, p. 88).  
 
The Dooge Report, 1985 
 
The new French President, François Mitterand, was one of the most 
enthusiastic figures of the proposals laid down by the European Parliament‘s Draft 
Treaty on European Union. He suggested that the 1983 Solemn Declaration should 
be used as the basis of the new treaty. Mitterand was strongly in favor of setting up 
of a permanent secretariat for political cooperation. Germany, Italy, and Benelux 
states also supported the idea in order to revive the federalist project (Hill & Smith, 
p. 138). However, Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister, was reluctant to agree 
with other member states because of the budgetary issues where she was insistent on 
to ―win Britain‘s money back‖ from other member states (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 29).  
The ongoing budgetary problem was solved at 1984 Fontainebleau European 
Council and Britain agreed to appointment of an ad-hoc committee on institutional 
affairs chaired by the Irish Representative James Dooge (Hill & Smith, p. 138). The 
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final version of the paper was presented in 1985 discussing the problems with regard 
to creation of an external identity for Europe. The Dooge Report was as a modest 
report in nature mainly due to Danish and Greek reservations. The Report suggested 
a closer cooperation between the structures of Community decision making and EPC 
without any emphasis on merging these two structures (Ifestos, p. 337). 
 
The Single European Act, 1987: A Key Event in the Quest for European Union 
 
 As the integration process began to emancipate from euro-sclerosis in the mid-
1980s, a trend within the Community emerged with the aim of transforming the 
relations between the Community and member states into a single unit – the European 
Union. An important number of these proposals suggested acceleration of foreign policy 
cooperation and institutional changes to the decision-making procedure of Community 
and EPC. These proposals were at the heart of June 1985 Milan European Council and 
1985 Intergovernmental Conference which formed the basis of Single European Act 
(SEA) of 1987. Though, the process on the way of SEA was far from being smooth, 
rather marked with ups and downs (Swann, 1992, p. 10).    
 In 1985, Jacques Delors who was in favor of deeper integration became the new 
Commission President. He urged for the necessity to set up a date for removal of all 
barriers and tariffs as well as free movement of labor and capital among member states. 
As a result, Commission initiated the Single Market Plan by proposing 1992 as the 
deadline for achievement. Besides economic aims, the Plan also intended to strengthen 
the integration process by changing the voting system of the Council of Ministers to 
qualified majority voting (QMV) and, hence, recovering from the veto system. In line 
with these aims, Lord Cockfield was assigned to present a White Paper setting up the 
schedule for the completion of the single market (George & Bache, 2001, pp. 114-116). 
 Two months after the launching of the White Paper, heads of states and 
governments met at the Milan European Council. The European Council agreed on the 
proposals introduced by the White Paper on the establishment of a single market by 
1992. Yet, a major disagreement emerged about the institutional change with regard to 
Community. The institutional debate was shaped around the question whether the veto 
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rights to member states should be kept in decision making process. Margaret Thatcher 
supported informal agreements rather than revision of decision-making system. By 
taking a coordinated stance, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterand argued for an urgent 
institutional reform. As a result of the disagreements, Italian Prime Minister Bettino 
Craxi called for an IGC to resolve these problems by revising the Treaty of Rome. 
Britain and Denmark strongly opposed the proposal of Italian Prime Minister by 
arguing that such action was not necessary and Greece supported them. The remaining 
seven member states voted in favor and decision to hold the IGC was agreed by 
majority vote (Dinan, 1999, pp. 115-116).  
The IGC started in September 1985 with the participation of foreign ministers of 
member states and the two candidate countries, Spain and Portugal, and the 
Commission. An agreement was reached regarding the further liberalization of the 
common market and transition to majority voting on issues related to internal market. 
Though, foreign policy cooperation still remained as a problematic issue (H. Smith, p. 
91). There were two competing groups in the Conference: one group represented by the 
UK and Denmark, the other represented by France and Italy. While the former put 
emphasis on internal market liberalization, the latter was in search of a stronger political 
commitment by pushing for an institutional reform (Owen & Dynes, 1993, p.55).  
Jacques Delors was supporting the second group. In his speech during the 
Conference, Delors stated that ―with regard, more specifically, to the political and 
institutional foundations for dynamic renewal of the Community, the gradualism which 
has worked well enough and proved its worth since the Treaty came into being is not in 
question‖ (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1985). Supporting a unified Europe, 
he argued for adoption of a single treaty which would strengthen the concept of 
European Union and would reveal the member states‘ will for speaking with one voice. 
As a result of the negotiations, a draft treaty was submitted by the Political Committee 
regarding political cooperation. France also proposed a draft treaty on European Union 
which would combine the competencies of Community and EPC in one treaty (Ifestos, 
pp. 344-345). However, French proposal was opposed by the other camp represented by 
the UK and Denmark. The divergent views among the member states included the 
objectives followed by EPC, managing body of the EPC, and the scope of EPC‘s 
relations with Community. Finally, a compromise was reached on the basis that 
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provisions relating to EPC were to be included in a different section – Title III – in the 
SEA (H. Smith, p. 91).  
At the Luxembourg European Council in 1985 the SEA was effectively agreed 
and it was signed in 1986 as the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome. The 
preamble of the SEA indicated that the intention of the member states was ―to transform 
relations as a whole among their States into a European Union‖ (The Single European 
Act, 1986). It represented a major step in the history of European integration. It 
introduced a plan for the completion of the internal market and majority voting to 
decision-making procedure. Regarding political cooperation, SEA codified EPC with 
reference to Luxembourg, Copenhagen, and London Reports and to the Stuttgart 
Solemn Declaration. In addition, it brought the EPC and Community under the same 
legal umbrella (Hill & Smith, p. 138). As Regelsberger (1988) stated ―for the first time 
in its history, political cooperation received a legal basis‖ (p. 9).  
Inclusion of provisions regarding the EPC into a separate title revealed that the 
SEA formalized a two ―pillar‖ structure although there was no explicit attempt for it 
(Allen, 1998, p. 50). The major innovation that SEA brought was the codification of 
EPC and European Council. Although the nature and methods of operation remained 
constant, the SEA formalized the intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy. Title 
III, named ―Treaty Provisions on European Cooperation in the Sphere of Foreign 
Policy‖, brought real changes even though they were modest (Hill & Smith, p. 139). It 
stated that the member states ―undertake to inform and consult each other on any 
foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is 
exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their 
positions and the implementation of joint action‖ (SEA, Article 30.2.a).  
Codifying all the agreements achieved over the years through different texts and 
treaties, the SEA defined the role of the European Council, the European Commission, 
and the European Parliament within the EPC. The SEA gave a leading role to European 
Council. The Council Presidency was assigned to identify and advance ―European 
interests‖ by representing the Member States vis-à-vis third countries. The European 
Commission was given a role for assisting the Council in all matters. According to 
SEA, the Commission‘s major role as initiator and negotiator that represents the 
European interests under the mandate of the Council would continue (Allen, p. 51). 
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Finally, the SEA strengthened the role of the European Parliament by giving it the 
power to assent future enlargements of the European Community and with the 
agreements with third countries or international organizations. In addition, the role of 
the Presidency and of the troika in the EPC was codified by SEA (Bindi, p. 25).  
 The SEA also effectively introduced the idea that foreign policy activity should 
take place in Brussels. With the SEA, EPC working groups were agreed to convene in 
Brussels which previously were functioning in the capital of the presidency. The 
Political Committee and Ministerial meetings might still take place in the capital of 
presidency but possibility to discuss EPC matters in the General Affairs Council was 
opened up. Finally, an important step towards bureaucratic structure was taken and the 
EPC Secretariat based in Brussels was established (Allen, p. 51).  
 According to M. Smith (2003), there are three important aspects of SEA with 
regard to foreign policy of the Community. First, it strengthened the intergovernmental 
character of the EPC through codification of its composition and the role of the 
European Council. Second, it also reinforced the trans-governmental network by the 
agreement on to permanently move Political Committee to Brussels. Third, the external 
EC and EPC policies were tied which were independent of each other before and they 
became legally binding on EU member states. However, full ―communitarization‖ was 
not accomplished formally by the SEA; rather it was an attempt to regularize the 
practices what had been reached throughout the years (pp. 151-153).  
 
The 1990s: Second Breakthrough – Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
 
Although the initiation of SEA represented an important leap towards further 
integrated Community, major change – not only to Europe but also to world politics – 
has come with the historical events of 1989-1991 beginning with the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall and ending with the demise of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. These events 
triggered the need for major reforms in existing international institutions including the 
EC, NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE. Further, it also led to creation of new ones such 
as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Keohane, Nye, & 
Hoffman, 1993).  
54 
 
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the prospect of a unified Germany had 
major implications for the future of Europe that is known of present time. The idea of a 
unified strong Germany presented a challenge for member states specifically for France 
and the UK. The challenge had two aspects – one being procedural and the other being 
political. The former was related to question how to absorb the relatively 
underdeveloped East Germany and create a stable cohesion between both parts. The 
latter question was how to maintain the commitment of Germany to EC and prevent it 
from dominating European affairs. On the other hand, Germany faced the challenge of 
reassuring its partners to its attachment to European integration (Dinan, 2005, p. 115).  
In such a dynamic environment, the foundational base for EPC was inefficient to 
cope with those changes. At 1989 G7 meeting, the US President G. Bush urged for the 
necessity to develop a coordinating assistance to Central and Eastern European states by 
the European Commission under the guidance of Jacques Delors. This proposal was to 
have an important effect on European politics by paving the way for a new policy area. 
As Cameron (2007) argues the number of Commission officials responsible for the 
relations with communist countries was fewer than ten in 1990 while it increased more 
than thousand in less than ten years with the opening of Commission delegations in 
almost all countries of the region (p. 28).  
 Although the collapse of the Soviet Union enhanced and specified the efforts for 
institutional reforms in European foreign policy, it was also a product of an endogenous 
process within the Community. Therefore, this process was of a cumulative nature 
acquired throughout the years by the EPC which formed the basis of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). According to M. Smith (2003), ―we can describe this 
evolution as moves toward a system of governance, broadly defined for the moment as 
the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules in a specified policy domain‖ (p. 
176). On the other hand, Cameron (2007) argues that the dramatic changes that were 
brought by the end of the Cold War signaled that Europe now was expected to increase 
its voice to gain more political influence and maintain stability in its borders. The 
limitations of EPC was evident which made it inevitable to build a stronger structure for 
foreign and security policy (p. 28). Therefore, Treaty on European Union was the result 
of the ‗1992 Plan‘ regarding the completion of monetary union and triggering effect of 
the end of communism in Europe regarding the political union.  
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The Treaty on European Union, 1992: Transition from European Political 
Cooperation to Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
 The dual structure of the issues – economic and political – shaped the 
negotiations of Treaty on European Union (TEU), also known as Maastricht Treaty, in 
1992 which took place in two separate intergovernmental conferences. The German 
question led many European leaders to search for strengthening and deepening of the 
EC institutions that would further bind Germany to European integration and hence 
preventing its dominance in Europe. This idea was commonly shared among the 
member states and Commission President Jacques Delors who argued that ―the only 
satisfactory and acceptable response to the German question‖ would be the creation of a 
federal Europe. The strongest supporter of this view was French government due to the 
prospect of facing a unified strong Germany which historically had been its major rival 
in the continent. In this regard, France sought for strengthening and deepening of EC 
structures (Baun, 1995, p. 609). Germany was also in favor of strengthening the 
institutions in order to prove its commitment to European integration. The proposals to 
create further cohesion in foreign policy were made by France and Germany in April 
1990. François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl proposed to build the monetary union 
combined with a political union which would enhance coherence among member states 
including a common foreign and security policy (Bindi, p. 26).  
 In contrast to French and German view, the British government under Prime 
Minister Thatcher was in favor of widening the EC by incorporating post-communist 
countries in Eastern Europe as well as members of European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA). The UK‘s main aim was to create stability in Eastern Europe by keeping the 
national sovereignties. Another motivation behind this strategy was the German 
question because for Thatcher a more unified Europe would become under German 
predominance rather than would a group of independent sovereign states. Although 
Portugal supported the British stance, these countries remained as minority among those 
in the Community who were in favor of deeper integration (Baun, p. 610).  
As a result of the political confrontation between the two camps, the decision to 
convene two intergovernmental conferences was taken – one on monetary union and 
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one on political union. During these negotiations, Germany reunified without any 
formal modifications of the treaties (Bindi, p. 26). The IGC on political union took 
place in December 1990. In the meantime, the international events such as Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the outbreak of Yugoslav crisis revealed that the decision of 
IGC would also become one of the focal points in world politics (H. Smith, p. 94). 
Therefore, the expectations about the Community to ‗have a say‘ in world politics were 
further increased. Although, there was an initial consensus about bringing EPC and 
external relations together and increased role of the Commission, the conference 
witnessed serious debates (Hill & Smith, p. 151).  
The negotiations were shaped by two traditionally competing camps. One camp, 
represented by the UK and Denmark, wished to keep the decision-making authority in 
the hands of member states while the other camp supported further integration in 
foreign policy issues. Another major disagreement was whether the EU should develop 
an independent defense policy or it should be left to NATO (Cameron, p. 29). The US 
and the more pro-NATO member states argued that the establishment of an independent 
defense policy would damage NATO which would eventually weaken western security 
as a whole. How to incorporate EPC into the Community structure represented another 
point of disagreement. Some member states supported a separate structure for EPC with 
an informal close association with the Community while others were in favor of 
abolishing the distinction. This situation also created dilemmas for small states because 
they supported convergence while at the same time they were worried about such 
convergence would bring them under the direction of powerful states (Hill, p. 152).  
 Following the end of the conference, Maastricht Treaty which created the 
European Union was signed. The agreed treaty was a product of a compromise among 
the majority of member states which were reluctant to adopt a more supranational 
policy. The EPC was replaced by intergovernmental CFSP which became the second 
pillar of newly established European Union along with Community Pillar and Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) Pillar. The Treaty stated that: 
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 ―the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy were to 
safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the 
independence of the Union; to strengthen its security and its member states 
in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to 
promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy 
and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms‖ 
(TEU, 1992, Art. J.1.2).  
 
 These objectives were to be pursued through cooperated action of member states 
in a ―spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity‖ (Art. J.1.4). The Treaty also addressed the 
issue of common defense by referring the ―possibility of gradually moving towards a 
defense system‖ (Art. J.4.1). Regarding institutional structure, the Presidency was given 
the responsibility to internationally represent the EU in CFSP issues. Outside the 
borders of the EU, there would be cooperation among member state diplomatic missions 
and European Commission delegations as well as consultation of the European 
Parliament (Art. J.5 & Art. J.7.). The Treaty stated that the general guidelines of foreign 
policy were to be defined by the European Council and responsibility to implement 
them was given to the Council on the basis of QMV. Further, the right to initiate foreign 
policy proposals was given to the Commission (Art. J.8. & Art. J.9). Last but not the 
least; the Treaty put forward the conditions and steps to be taken to establish economic 
and monetary union by 1997.  
 The Maastricht Treaty, officially establishing the European Union, marked the 
beginning of a new stage in European affairs by further taking a leap towards ‗an ever 
closer union‘. An important part of the Treaty was built on the past EC treaties, the 
body of law, and policy made by the institutions over four decades. Newly introduced 
provisions of the Treaty aimed to respond external challenges of the time that the 
Community faced as well as enlargement (Duff, 1994, p. 20). Regarding economic 
policies, the TEU established the EMU which aimed: 
―to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced 
development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of employment and social protection, 
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States‖(TEU, Art. 2). 
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 Regarding the newly established CFSP, the Treaty sought to respect the acquis 
communitaire but it remained as a structure qualitatively different from its supranational 
structure by following the experience of the EPC procedures. Although the Council was 
given the responsibility of taking ministerial decisions, CFSP remained as an 
intergovernmental pillar and excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The 
CFSP was to pursue its objectives through ‗common positions‘ and ‗joint actions‘. 
Common positions represented the common procedure of EPC while joint actions were 
based on a more complicated practice. For an issue to become subject to joint action the 
Council has to decide by unanimity based on the guidelines from the European Council 
(Duff, p. 24).  
In fact, before the ratification of the TEU, European foreign ministers agreed on 
that the Treaty procedure would be unable to generate a common policy. After the 
agreement on the Treaty, they decided to launch a report that was to define Europe‘s 
common interests and the areas of priority for the CFSP. With this aim, the Lisbon 
Report which identified the areas where joint actions to be taken was launched at the 
Lisbon European Council of June 1992. The Report had a theoretical nature where the 
EU was to act in international politics. In this sense, the emphasis was given on 
promotion of democracy, human rights, and conflict prevention in the EU‘s regions of 
interest such as Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East 
(Hill & Smith, p. 162). During the period between 1993 and 1995 eight joint actions 
were implemented such as monitoring the elections in Russia and South Africa, 
supporting measures to create stability in Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) and the Middle East. Furthermore, fourteen common positions were adopted 
in the same period (Bindi, p. 28). 
To summarize, the move from EPC to CFSP signaled the major recognition of 
the developing economic power of the EU needed to support by a political dimension 
(Cameron, p. 38). However, newly established CFSP was not able to represent an all-
encompassing foreign policy for the member states due to its intergovernmental nature. 
The major philosophical innovation it brought was the idea that it was an evolutionary 
process where both foreign policy and Community policies continued to be integrated 
under one single institutional structure (H. Smith, p. 96).  As M. Smith (2003) argues 
―the process of institutional change did not end at Maastricht; this Treaty merely raised 
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new expectations and created new pressures for reform, thus setting the stage for the 
1996-1997 IGC of the EU‖ (p. 177).   
 
Other Developments in the 1990s: International Crises and the Fourth 
Enlargement 
 
In the mid-1990s there were other developments both with regard to the EU and 
in world politics which proved the need for reforms that would take place in 1996-1997. 
The dissolution and war in Yugoslavia proved the inability of the EU in tackling with 
international crisis. Apart from the Yugoslavian case, the inability of the Union to adopt 
a common position in the Middle East, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Central 
Africa further strengthened the beliefs for a reform regarding the structure of the 
European foreign policy (Bindi, p. 34). In 1995, the Union also underwent the fourth 
enlargement process with new members from the north. Austria, Sweden, and Finland 
became members of the EU while the Norwegian referendum with the refusal of the 
public prevented Norwegian membership. The membership of advanced democracies 
did not require a significant change to foreign policy priorities of the Union. 
Furthermore, their long-established liberal economies facilitated the smooth transition 
to the EU membership (H. Smith, p. 101).  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997: Revising the Union 
 
 The inability of TEU to tackle with the international crises of the time led to 
another IGC that would contain the untouched areas of policy. As already foreseen by 
the TEU, Title V Article N stated that ―a conference of representatives of governments 
of Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of the treaty 
for which revision is provided.‖ One of the provisions that the Treaty stated was about 
the WEU which came to deadline for review. Other issues at stake were the expanded 
use of majority voting, the balance between big and small countries, financing the 
CFSP, and the ever present question of how to ‗speak with one voice‘. With these issues 
in question, the new IGC began in Turin on March 1996 after a Reflection Group had 
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set the agenda three months before the Madrid European Council (Hill & Smith, p. 
168). 
 The Report prepared by the Reflection Group put emphasis on the shortcomings 
of the EU‘s pillar structure. The intergovernmental nature of the decision-making 
system in the second and third Pillars was the major obstacles on the EU to ‗speak with 
one voice‘. According to the Report, the weakness of pillar structure reflected itself as 
the EU‘s inability to respond to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Regarding the voting 
system, it was seen essential to replace unanimity with the QMV if the EU was to 
survive in the upcoming years in the face of enlargement. Therefore, the Reflection 
Group suggested three major aims for the 1996 IGC: bringing the EU closer to its 
citizens, improvement of functioning in order to prepare for enlargement, and providing 
a greater capacity for foreign policy (Phinnemore, 2010, p. 38).  
 The negotiations in the 1996 IGC revealed that the reform process was not to be 
easily achieved. The British government retained its traditional reluctance and policy of 
non-cooperation as well as the reluctance of other member states and the public. The 
agenda of almost all member states was occupied by EMU and the issue of enlargement 
(Hill & Smith, p. 169). The British general elections during the IGC also revealed that 
the final agreement would have to wait for a longer period. After the elections, the 
Labour Party‘s victory relatively facilitated the negotiations of IGC (Dedman, 2009, p. 
167). Regarding the shortcomings of CFSP, the prevailing view during the IGC was to 
keep intergovernmental structure of CFSP rather than pushing for a more unified 
structure with whole EU body. Yet, in order to strengthen CFSP several reforms were 
proposed such as involvement of European Council more to increase consistency, 
creating the post of High Representative, development of long-term strategies, and 
defining the concept of security (Phinnemore, 2010, p. 39). Upon the completion of 
IGC, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on October 1997 yet it was subject to severe 
criticisms due to its failure to accomplish the objectives (Dedman, p. 167).  
In spite of the organized preparations by the Reflection Group and lengthy 
negotiations before the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the achievements of the 
Treaty was not considered as a major success by the politicians and bureaucrats. 
According to Jacques Delors, ―Amsterdam Treaty was a ‗catastrophic result‘ for 
Europe‖. In contrast to what was foreseen at the Maastricht Treaty regarding the 
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internal policy-developing exercise was dominated by the issues about EMU and 
enlargement (Cameron, 1998, pp. 70-71). While the Treaty did not introduce any 
philosophical changes to the structure of CFSP, it brought some institutionalized 
procedural innovations and amendments to decision-making procedures. These 
innovations include the creation of a Policy and Planning Unit for the CFSP and a 
secretary-general within the Council Secretariat to deal with CFSP. The Secretary-
General of the Council was to be responsible for the CFSP and was appointed as the 
‗High Representative‘. The constitution of troika was transformed to the Presidency, the 
High Representative, the Commission, and the successor Presidency (H. Smith, p. 101).  
The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced a new instrument named ‗common 
strategies‘ along with clarifying the distinction between previously defined joint actions 
and common positions. Yet, common strategies were vaguely defined as the strategies 
to be adopted in areas where member states have common interests. In the Treaty, joint 
actions were defined as ―they shall address specific situations where operational action 
is needed‖ (Art. J.4.), and common positions were defined as ―they shall define the 
approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature‖ (Art. 
J. 5.). Regarding the decision-making system, the Treaty did not bring any significant 
change to the TEU. The major principles of the foreign policy making, consensus and 
unanimity were retained the same. However, the principle of unanimity was made 
flexible to facilitate decision-making with the introduction of ‗constructive abstention‘ 
meaning that states abstaining from voting were not to be committed by the decision but 
also to refrain from any action likely to conflict with that decision (Cameron, pp. 72-
73).  
The ratification of the Treaty also took a long time for the signatories. Finally, it 
fully entered into force on May 1999. The following Cologne Council of June returned 
to subject of CFSP with new proposals but they were mainly focused on the security 
dimension. Therefore, the Cologne Council was another attempt to re-launch the CFSP 
by equipping it with necessary capabilities to face its responsibilities. During the 
Council, the former Spanish foreign minister was appointed as the ‗High 
Representative‘. Therefore, the changes that the Treaty of Amsterdam brought 
represented a more substantial change rather than what was predicted at the TEU and 
report of the Reflection Group. The EU still needed a considerable progress to move 
towards further integration at the beginning of the new century. As Hill & Smith (2000) 
62 
 
state ―whatever ups and downs lie ahead for the institutional development of the CFSP, 
the story of Europe‘s attempt to construct a common foreign policy is far from being 
concluded. There are more documents, more treaties – and more arguments – to come‖ 
(p. 170).  
 
The 2000s: Third Breakthrough – On the Way to Treaty of Lisbon 
 
 The beginning of the new century was stamped by two significant events for 
European politics and evolution of the EU. First, the Kosovo War of 1998 explicitly 
revealed the inability of the EU to respond to international crises and it urged the need 
for institutional reform for the Union if it was to have a say in world politics. Faced 
with the lack of capabilities to respond to a crisis on the European continent itself, the 
demands for building a defense system increased. Second issue on the European agenda 
was the Eastern enlargement. For the first time in its history, the EU was to undergo a 
considerable expansion with ten countries from which eight were post-communist 
states. The future effect of the enlargement on political, geographic, demographic, and 
economic balance of the Union was obvious with the prospect of increasing the 
population by almost one-third while increasing the GNP only by 10 percent (Bindi, pp. 
35-36). Therefore, how to accommodate the new members became an important 
question with the fact that without any regulation the decision-making in the Union 
would come to a deadlock. As stated above, the Treaty of Amsterdam proved to be 
inefficient to deliver the desired changes regarding the institutional reform (Dedman, p. 
166).  
 At the meeting in Cologne on June 1999, the European Council agreed on to 
convene an IGC at the beginning of 2000 to address the issues regarding the 
enlargement. Furthermore, the European Council of Helsinki on December 1999 
expanded the aims of the planned IGC to deal with the issues unresolved by the 
Amsterdam Treaty – so called ‗Amsterdam leftovers‘ – such as the organization of the 
European Commission, the reweighing of the votes in the European Council, and the 
extension of the QMV (Bindi, p. 36). The preferences of member states reflected more 
of a limited agenda while the Commission and the EP were in favor of broader issue 
coverage. The Commission supported the reorganization of the treaties and the 
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integration of the WEU to the EU to have a common defense policy. The Report 
prepared by the Commission urged for the necessity to reform the EU in a flexible way 
that would allow for progress towards the goal of further integration. The French 
government was also in favor of building a European constitution. However, these aims 
proved to be too ambitious for the time and it was evident in the discourse of other 
member states blaming French government to abuse their position as chair to impose 
their own agenda rather than mediating the negotiations. At the end of lengthy 
negotiations, the Treaty of Nice was signed on February 2001 (Phinnemore, pp. 41-42). 
 
The Treaty of Nice, 2003: Dealing with „Amsterdam Leftovers‟ 
 
 The Treaty of Nice entered into force on February 2003. The reforms regarding 
the CFSP were quite limited since the agenda was dominated by the enlargement and 
defense policy. Regarding enlargement the votes were reweighted and the number of the 
Commissioners was reduced while WEU was incorporated in the EU with regard to 
defense policy. The incremental changes in CFSP largely focused on the cleaning up the 
wording in few areas. QMV in decision-making for CFSP was extended to two minor 
areas beyond what was outlined by the Amsterdam Treaty which were the appointing of 
the High Representative as the Secretary General of Council and nominating of special 
envoys (M. Smith, p. 234).  
Besides these minor reforms, the Treaty introduced the principle of ‗flexibility‘ 
into the set of rules on ‗enhanced cooperation‘ which refers the situations where some 
member states in the enlarged Union – group of the ‗willing‘ – could take an action for 
a specific policy serving the common interests and objectives of the CFSP. Therefore, 
any action that would be taken for this end should safeguard the values and serve the 
interests of the EU with the emphasis on the coherent identity. However, the Treaty 
excluded the extension of enhanced cooperation to the areas of military and defense 
whereas could only be applied to common positions and joint actions (Regelsberger 
2001, p. 159). This limitation reduced the scope of the cooperation with regard to CFSP 
and made it clear that the member states would cooperate based on consensus and 
pragmatic decision-making by using economic means rather than military capability (M. 
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Smith, p. 236). To summarize, the Treaty of Nice prepared the EU for the new 
enlargement while leaving the CFSP issues as modestly altered.  
 
Other Developments in the 2000s: European Security Strategy, 2003 and Fifth 
Enlargement 
 
In the mid-2000s, another development was the launch of European Security 
Strategy (ESS) approved by the European Council in Brussels on December 2003. The 
Strategy was drafted by the High Representative Javier Solana with the focus on 
ensuring the security for Europe in a globalized world. In order to secure Europe‘s place 
in the world, the ESS urged for a multilateral cooperation within Europe and abroad 
because of the fact that ―no single nation is able to tackle today‘s complex challenges‖ 
(ESS, 2003, p. 1). The ESS outlined the key challenges that the EU faced in the new 
century such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
conflict, failed states, and organized crime. Therefore, it was agreed for the EU to 
promote regional governance in Europe and to become more capable to tackle with the 
problems of the new century (Bindi, p. 37).  
Another development in the mid-2000s was the fifth enlargement that increased 
the number of member states from fifteen to twenty-five, and twenty-seven eventually. 
In 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia joined the EU and then followed by Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007. The major implication of the new enlargement covering a broad 
geography was the extension of its external borders which would require for further 
regulations for foreign policy (Bindi, pp. 37-38). These developments in the mid-2000s 
required further steps to be taken which was also foreseen by the Treaty of Nice.  
 
The Constitutional Treaty, 2004: Roadmap to Lisbon Treaty 
 
 The Treaty of Nice did not signal the end of the CFSP reforms. Rather, the effect 
of enlargement and the changes in the global politics such as terrorist attacks of 9/11 
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and the war against Iraq in 2003 triggered the Union to redefine their place with an 
active role in world politics. The Draft Constitutional Treaty, one of the biggest steps in 
European politics, was designed in the light of these events. As stated by the Treaty of 
Nice and Laeken Declaration of 2001, a new IGC was to hold in order to revise the 
existing TEU legal framework (Regelsberger & Vessels, 2004, p. 102). The priority was 
defined as the clarification of the procedures and tasks of EU institutions strengthen the 
EP, national Parliaments and the transparency of proceedings. The overall aim was to 
bring closer the EU and the public. The proposed Draft Treaty included all earlier 
Treaties and incorporated the ‗pillars‘ of the Union into a unified body as well as a legal 
personality for the EU. This was an attempt for centralization of the Union by extending 
Brussels‘ authority to intergovernmental issues (Dedman, p. 174).  
 Regarding the evolution of the CFSP, the Draft Treaty added some new 
innovations to the traditional procedures that culminated throughout the years. It 
strengthened the role of the European Council which was to be responsible for 
identifying strategic interests and objectives of the Union. It also introduced the 
extended Presidency of the European Council and responsibilities for the chair to 
represent EU externally. One of the major innovations was the establishment of a Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs which would be the sole signal of authorizing the Union on 
foreign policy issues. Despite these major steps, the progress in decision-making 
structure was rather modest. With the attempts of traditional supporters of unanimity 
principle like the UK, the Draft Treaty confirmed the existing rules and did not go 
beyond the defined principles (Regelsberger & Vessels, p. 103). 
Following the end of the IGC, the Draft Constitutional Treaty was signed in 
Rome in October 2004. Yet, eleven member states were to hold referendums to ratify 
the Treaty. First positive outcome of referendum came from Spain. However, in 2005 it 
was rejected by the public in France and the Netherlands (Church & Phinnemore, p. 49). 
The rejection by the French and Dutch public created an atmosphere of pessimism. 
Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean Claude Juncker, stated that ―Europe is not in a crisis; 
it is in a deep crisis‖. According to Dedman (2009) if France and the Netherlands did 
not reject the Treaty, the UK and Poland would have done in their referendums (p. 174). 
In spite of this pessimistic atmosphere, other states continued to ratify the Treaty during 
the so-called ‗period of reflection‘. As a result, German Council Presidency offered 
another deal by proposing a new IGC that would keep the innovations brought by the 
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Treaty whereas eliminating the propositions what made the Treaty ‗constitutional‘ 
(Church & Phinnemore, p. 49). The outcome of the new IGC was to be the Treaty of 
Lisbon.  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon, 2009: End of the Way on „Speaking with One Voice‟? 
 
 After the failure of Constitutional Treaty, new reform process started with the 
initiations of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. With the electoral victory of Nicholas 
Sarkozy as the French President, French support for German initiation increased and it 
culminated into a new IGC to discuss the reform and re-implementation of 
Constitutional Treaty. An informal European Council in Lisbon in 2007 brought the 
negotiations to a close and the Treaty of Lisbon, the replacement of the Constitutional 
Treaty, was signed (Church & Phinnemore, p. 55). The Treaty of Lisbon led to a 
simplification of the Union‘s structure by eliminating the pillar structure, granted the 
EU to a legal personality, and brought institutional amendments to the European foreign 
policy making (Koehler, 2010, p. 58).  
 The Treaty of Lisbon brought substantial changes to the European foreign policy 
in terms of institutional structure. The explicit statement of the EU‘s legal personality 
has two consequences for the CFSP. First, it clarified the question about who is in 
charge as a European party in international relations specifically as the signatory in 
international agreements. Second, it corresponds to the external means of the EU to 
implement the CFSP (Koehler, p. 63). With regard to institutional structure, the Treaty 
of Lisbon brought three major innovations by introducing the position of High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the position of 
President of the European Council, and the European External Action Service.  
 The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was a 
replacement of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs as introduced by the Constitutional 
Treaty. The two differently named positions had the same mandates but the Treaty of 
Lisbon avoided using ‗Minister‘ for this position due to fear of member states‘ 
perception of losing national sovereignties. The newly created position combined two 
responsibilities of the existing CFSP High Representative and the EU Commissioner for 
67 
 
external affairs (Verola, 2010, p. 44). Granting High Representative ‗two hats‘ job with 
the aim of eliminating the dual structure of Community and CFSP policies represented a 
breaking point for the institutional structure. With the ‗Council hat‘, the High 
Representative was to be the chair of Foreign Affairs Council and was to run the foreign 
and security policy of the Union. On the other hand, the High Representative was to be 
a member of the college and one of its vice presidents with the ‗Commission hat‘ (Paul, 
2008, p. 16).  
 The High Representative‘s duties vary according to matters fall under the CFSP 
umbrella or external relations. In the former, the High Representative was to act as the 
representative of the European Council with the right of initiative. In the latter case, the 
High Representative was to act as an integral part of the European Commission (Verola, 
p. 44). The European Council was given the authority to appoint the High 
Representative by voting on the basis of qualified majority. Furthermore, the 
Commission President has to give assent to the nomination. To gain a democratic 
strength, the EP was given the responsibility to vote of approval for the High 
Representative as well as the right to ask for him or her to resign. For this position, 
Baroness Catherine Ashton, former Commissioner for Trade, was appointed by the 
Council in 2009 (Missiroli, 2010, p. 431). 
 Another major innovation brought by the Treaty of Lisbon was the introduction 
of the European Council as one of the EU‘s constituent institutions and the position of 
European Council President. The introduction of European Council as a formal 
institution of the EU granted the right to Council to identify the strategic interests and 
the objectives of the Union although the Council had already been exercising these 
functions before the Treaty of Lisbon. The introduction of position of European Council 
President was also an important development that brought continuity to European 
foreign policy making. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the head of state or government of 
the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers also had the 
responsibility to chair the meetings of the European Council. Therefore, the Presidency 
of the Council was also subject to change according to the rules of rotating presidency. 
With the Treaty of Lisbon reforms, the European Council President had a ‗permanent‘ 
role with two and a half year in the office which also could be renewed once. The 
European Council was given the authority to elect the President of the European 
Council on the basis of QMV. In 2009, the European Council elected Herman van 
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Rompuy, the former Belgian Prime Minister, as the President of the European Council 
(Koehler, p. 68).  
 Another substantial innovation brought by the Treaty of Lisbon was the 
introduction of a new service that was to be responsible to ‗assist‘ the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This new service was named as 
European External Action Service (EEAS) which was to bring efficiency for the High 
Representative to fulfill his or her actions. According to the Treaty, ―in fulfilling his 
mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action 
Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the 
Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General 
Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from 
national diplomatic services of the member states‖ (Art. 27(3)). The duties of the EEAS 
were to ensure the consistency and coordination of the Union‘s external action and to 
prepare policy proposal and implement them following the approval of the Council. The 
Service was also to assist the President of the European Council, the President and the 
Members of the Commission in their duties (Paul, pp. 23-24). 
 Although the Treaty of Lisbon brought substantial changes to the institutional 
structure of the CFSP, the reforms regarding the decision-making procedure rather 
signaled modest changes from the prior treaties. The Treaty preserved the innovations 
of the Constitutional Treaty in the extension of majority vote and enhanced cooperation. 
The Treaty also adopted the same general provisions as before which authorized the 
European Council to unanimously decide whether to adopt QMV in areas where 
unanimity is still foreseen. Therefore, the QMV was extended to only specific areas 
rather than to whole CFSP decision-making (Verola, pp. 45-46). Although the decision-
making based on unanimity bound the foreign policy making to the willingness of 
member states, the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon represented a significant 
step towards increasing the coherence of the European foreign policy which would 
increase the effectiveness of the policies and strengthen the EU‘s capability to ‗speak 
with one voice‘ in world politics.   
This chapter has presented the development of EU foreign policy since the 
establishment of the EU until present time. The argument of the foreign policy 
development of the EU provides useful insights in understanding the EU sanctions 
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policy practices today because the EU sanctions policy practices follows the same trend 
with the development of EU foreign policy. As argued throughout the chapter, there are 
three important events that led to further integration of the EU foreign policy. The first 
phase started with the completion of the EPC in 1981 as the predecessor of the EU 
foreign policy. The second phase started with the entry into force of the TEU which 
built the CFSP as a separate pillar of the Union. Finally, the beginning of the last phase 
was marked with the entry into force of Treaty of Lisbon which shaped the present 
foreign policy of the EU. In light of this argument, next chapter analyses the EU 
sanctions policy practices with regard to three separate phases and then presents a 
general characterization of the EU sanctions policy practices with basic descriptive 
statistics. Then it builds the bridge with the first chapter and argues that the EU is 
transforming itself to a smart power with the introduction of the sanctions as a foreign 
policy tool.  
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CHAPTER III: EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS POLICY PRACTICES 
 
Development of European Union Sanctions Policy  
 
The use of sanctions has become a common foreign policy tool for many 
international actors as well as the EU to induce a change in a target state‘s policies. The 
utility of sanctions stems from inability of diplomatic measures to bring the desired 
change and costly nature of military actions in certain cases. Therefore, sanctions offer a 
middle ground between ―words and wars‖ (Wallensteen & Staibano, 2005). The EU, 
like both national and international actors in world politics, has been employing 
sanctions increasingly over the years. The development of sanctions policy of the EU 
resembles the development process of European foreign policy – reflecting an 
evolutionary nature.  
Although the EU sanctions policy roots back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the 
sanctions imposed represented more of ‗economic‘ concerns with regard trade relations 
with the rest of the world (Kreutz, p. 7). A new era in sanctions policy started in 1980s 
with London Report establishing the last phase of EPC and first sanctions of ‗political‘ 
nature imposed against Soviet Union in 1982 as a response to Soviet intervention in 
Poland (Bindi, p. 20). However, until the Treaty on European Union sanctions were 
imposed on the basis of national legislations (Rolenc et al, 2010, p. 109). In other 
words, until 1992 sanctions represented a policy domain where there member states 
‗cooperate‘ rather than having a ‗common‘ policy.  
Therefore, since the 1990s the nature of EU sanctions policy has changed in an 
important level which led the way to autonomous EU sanctions. With the inclusion of 
economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, the Union combined the range of purely 
economic instruments under the first pillar into political instruments under the second 
pillar (Giumelli, 2013a, p. 395). According to TEU, the objectives of EU sanctions 
policy are the same as CFSP objectives which were: 
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―to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the 
independence of the Union; to strengthen its security and its member states 
in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to 
promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy 
and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms‖ 
(TEU, 1992, Art. J.1.2).  
 
Since the TEU‘s entry into force, the number of sanctions imposed by the Union, not by 
the member states, increased tremendously and reached a peak in recent years after the 
entry into force of Treaty of Lisbon. Following the TEU and the increasing political will 
to resort to sanctions led the EU to adopt three key documents that are related almost all 
aspects of the EU sanctions policy (Giumelli, 2013a, p. 395). 
 The first document is the ‗Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures‘ 
(‗Basic Principles‘, hereon) which was adopted in June 2004 upon the request by the 
Council to introduce a framework for the effective implementation of sanctions. With 
the approval of Basic Principles, the Union committed itself to use economic sanctions 
as a tool to maintain and restore international peace and security (Basic Principles, 
2004). According to Basic Principles, 
 
 ―If necessary, the Council will impose autonomous EU sanctions in support 
of efforts to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and as a restrictive measure to uphold respect for human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance. [The Union] will do this 
in accordance with [the Union’s] common foreign and security policy, as 
set out in Article 11 TEU, and in full conformity with [the Union’s] 
obligations under international law‖ (Council of European Union, 2004, 
Art 3).  
 
Basic Principles also clarified an important feature of EU sanctions regarding the 
question of ‗whom to punish‘. As stated in the document, ―sanctions should be targeted 
in a way that has maximum impact on those whose behavior [the Union] want to 
influence. Targeting should reduce to the maximum extent possible any adverse 
humanitarian effects or unintended consequences for persons not targeted or 
neighboring countries‖ (Basic Principles, 2004). This principle was already adopted by 
the UN in the 1990s in order to reduce the undesired hardship imposed on the respective 
public of targeted states.  
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 The second document related to the EU sanctions policy is the ‗Guidelines on 
Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the framework of 
the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy‘ (‗Guidelines‘, hereon). ‗Guidelines‘ was 
approved in 2003 and was updated three times in 2005, 2009, and 2012. In contrast to 
relatively short and limited in scope Basic Principles, Guidelines offer a comprehensive 
understanding of how the EU sanctions work by outlining the objectives, legal basis, 
and the Union‘s competences. It argues that the experience of the EU as a ‗sanctioner‘ 
in world politics urges for the necessity ―to standardize implementation and to 
strengthen methods of implementation. The guidelines address a number of general 
issues and present standard wording and common definitions that may be used in the 
legal instruments implementing restrictive measures‖ (Guidelines, 2012).  
The first part of the Guidelines provides a framework of characterization of EU 
sanctions policy. Since decision to impose sanctions on a target needs political will of 
the member states, they may be applied only after a political decision was adopted. In 
other words, the initial decision to apply sanctions or not is not governed by the 
Guidelines. The second part of the document focuses on basic principles with regard to 
imposition of sanctions such as objectives of sanctions, targeting of sanctions, the 
creation of sanctions lists, exemptions, and the implementation of UN resolutions. The 
third part of the Guidelines outlines the common definitions in conformity with the 
CFSP when implementing sanctions. The final part of the document focuses on the 
monitoring and evaluation of sanctions by defining the mandate of the Sanctions 
Formation of Foreign Relations Counselor Working Party (RELEX/Sanctions).  
 Finally, the third document is the ‗EU Best Practices for the Effective 
Implementation of Restrictive Measures‘ (‗Best Practices‘, hereon). The document was 
adopted in 2006 and was updated in 2007 and 2008. Best Practices proposes the ways of 
―identification of designated persons and entities in order to improve the effectiveness 
of administrative measures and restrictions on admission and to avoid unnecessary 
problems caused by homonyms or near-identical names‖ (Best Practices, 2008). In 
short, the document offers a practical guidance with regard to identification of 
individuals who are responsible from undesired behavior in the target state. In this 
respect, Best Practices are aimed to supplement the Guidelines. The first part of the 
document focuses on targeted restrictive measures and de-listing. The following three 
parts explain freezing of funds and economic resources, humanitarian exemptions, the 
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prohibitions on the provisions of goods and services. The final part of the document 
introduces a vision on how to achieve ideal cooperation and coordination among 
member states, institutions of the EU, and the expertise groups on sanctions.  
 
What Kind of Sanctions the EU Imposes? 
 
 ‗Sanctions‘ is a general term used in the literature that refers specific sub-
categories. The EU adopts a broad range of sanctions which include diplomatic 
sanctions (expulsion of diplomats, severing of diplomatic ties, and suspension of official 
visits); suspension of cooperation with a third country; boycotts of sport or cultural 
events; trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, and arms embargoes); 
financial sanctions (freezing of funds or economic resources, prohibition of financial 
transactions, and restrictions on export credits or investment); flight bans; and 
restriction on admission (European Commission, 2008).  
 In recent years, the EU has increasingly adopted sanctions in the form of arms 
embargoes, economic and financial restrictions, and restrictions on admission 
(European Commission, 2008). The reason for the focus on these types of sanctions 
stems from the view on reducing the costs of sanctions on the civilian population of the 
target state and punishing those responsible for the undesired policies. Until 1990s the 
typical form of sanctions used was ‗embargo‘ which restricts export or import of certain 
goods. The transition from ‗comprehensive sanctions‘ to ‗targeted‘ or ‗smart‘ sanctions 
reflects the transition from state centric sanctions to non-state actors (i.e., individuals, 
groups, or companies) and they focus on only specific sectors or specific products 
(Cortright & Lopez, 2002). This trend was initiated by the UN after the unintended 
effects of sanctions on the civilian population of Iraq and Haiti and following criticism 
directed to the UN (Gibbons, 1999, p. 39). Therefore, in line with its primary norms to 
protect civilians, the EU followed the trend by the UN and recently imposes targeted 
sanctions.  
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Arms Embargoes 
  
Arms embargoes are based on the decision to prohibit the sale of weapons to a 
certain country, region, group or individual, who might have incentive to use them 
against peace processes and civilians and to undermine the stability of regimes. The EU 
adopts arms embargoes to stop the flow of arms and military equipment to the regions 
of conflict and to the regimes that might use them against a foreign country or its 
civilian population to repress them. In this respect, the EU also bans the provision of 
financial and technical assistance, brokering services and other services related to 
military activities. The exceptions to arms embargoes apply if there is humanitarian or 
protective use, institution building programs, and crisis management operations such as 
representatives of media and personnel of development programs (European 
Commission, 2008). 
 
Economic and Financial Sanctions 
  
Given the combined economic power of 28 member states, the economic and 
financial sanctions of the EU may significantly harm the target state. This type of 
sanctions involves export and/or import bans of specific products such as timber, oil, 
and diamonds; bans on the provision of specific services such as financial and technical 
assistance; flight bans, prohibitions on investment; payment and capital movements; or 
withdrawal of tariff preferences (European Commission, 2008). Such sanctions, 
specifically the bans on export and/or import, are designed to distort the domestic 
distribution of power in the target state (Cortright & Lopez, p. 181). However, in order 
to prevent civilian suffering the EU applies economic and financial restrictive measures 
to all persons and entities operating businesses in the EU, including the nationals of 
non-EU states. In this respect, the EU has often imposed targeted financial sanctions to 
the specific persons as stated above. These targeted financial sanctions include freezing 
of all funds and economic resources of targeted persons and entities responsible for the 
objectionable policies. Exemptions apply in certain conditions such as payments for 
foodstuffs and medicines (European Commission, 2008).  
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Restrictions on Admission (Visa or Travel Ban) 
 
 Travel bans refer to the ban on the entrance of certain individuals to a given 
territory. The motivation of such sanctions is creating discomfort or preventing certain 
individuals from carrying out actions. Travel bans are adopted specifically in the face of 
threat from terrorist organizations to prevent them from travelling in EU countries 
(Giumelli, 2011, p. 14). In line with the decision, the member states are called upon to 
take all the necessary measures to prevent listed persons from the entry into or transit 
through their territories. Similar to other sanction types, exemptions apply on 
humanitarian or other grounds in conformity with the international law (European 
Commission, 2008).  
Flight Ban 
 
 The EU also imposes sanctions in the form of flight ban but the legal difficulties 
encountered with regard to this type of sanction made flight ban an undesirable 
measure. There has been only one case where a country was subject to flight ban. In 
1998, Yugoslavia was subject to this type of sanction along with other measures. 
However, the UK failed to enforce the sanctions because its existing air services 
agreement with Yugoslavia took precedence over EC law (Portela, p. 57). 
Diplomatic, Cultural, and Sports Sanctions 
 
 Diplomatic, cultural, and sports sanctions refers to type of measures that induce 
a limitation of contacts, the invitation of political dissidents to national celebrations at 
embassies abroad, and the suspension of scientific cooperation. By their nature, this 
type of sanctions has a more symbolic effect on the target which led to rare use of them 
by the EU (Portela, p. 58).  
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Decision-Making Process of the EU Sanctions Policy 
 
 The decision making for imposition of sanctions in the EU can be considered in 
two different structures according to the type of sanction on the agenda – sanctions 
those falling under the Community and CFSP domain. Portela (2010) classifies three 
different decision-making procedures for EU sanctions policy since the entry into force 
of TEU until the Treaty of Lisbon 2009. First, the decision to implement sanctions is 
taken by the Community and the authority to impose sanctions is also given to the 
Community. These types of sanctions include the withdrawal of Generalized Systems of 
Preference (GSP) benefits, suspension of financial and technical assistance, suspension 
of development aid, interruption of trade and cooperation agreements, postponement of 
new projects, and interruption of decisions to implement cooperation (p. 27).  
 These ‗community sanctions‘ are decided on the basis of QMV by the Council 
following the proposals of the European Commission with the exception of suspension 
of trade and cooperation agreements. Regarding these sanctions the Council acts 
unanimously (Eriksson, 2005, p. 109). For sanctions under the domain of Cotonou 
Convention, the Council decides on the basis of QMV regarding partial suspension and 
on the basis of unanimity for full suspension. On the other hand, some sanctions are 
decided by the European Commission only. For example, Commission suspended aid to 
Equatorial Guinea in 1992 without the involvement of the Council. The European 
Parliament also has the authority to delay the ratification of cooperation. For instance, 
the EP blocked the initiation of new 5-year aid to Syria in 1992 due to Syria‘s poor 
human rights records (Hazelzet, 2001, p. 71).  
 Second, sanctions are agreed under the domain of CFSP and implemented by the 
Community. These sanctions involve trade embargoes, financial sanctions, and flight 
bans. The procedure starts with the agreement decided by the Council on the basis of a 
unanimity vote that result with a legal act either in the form of a Common Position or a 
Joint Action. Then, a Community Regulation is adopted to implement the decision. For 
Community Regulations regarding trade embargoes and financial sanctions, the Council 
decides by QMV (EC Treaty, Art. 301). Finally, sanctions are decided under the domain 
of CFSP and implemented by the member states on the basis of their national 
legislations where the EU does not have competence. Arms embargoes, visa bans, 
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diplomatic and cultural sanctions fall under this category. The decision to implement is 
taken on the basis of unanimity by the Council (Jones, 2007, pp. 115-116).  
 Until the Treaty of Lisbon, the principle of unanimity in certain cases prevented 
effective decision-making mechanism in EU sanctions policy. For example, arms 
embargo against Indonesia automatically expired in 2000 although the crisis in East 
Timor continued. The necessary decision for continuation of sanctions required another 
Council decision however with the veto vote of Portugal, the Union failed to take 
necessary measure before the expiry date of sanctions (Hazelzet, p. 100). With the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union has eliminated unanimity vote in sanctions 
policy. Since 2009 the Council acts on the basis of QMV on a joint proposal from the 
European Commission and the High Representative and informs the European 
Parliament (TFEU, Art. 215). Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened the legal 
basis of EU sanctions policy.  
 
EU Sanctions Policy Practices 
 
The EU sanctions policy practices can be divided into three phases: First phase 
involves the time period starting from development and completion of EPC (1981-
1992). Second phase covers the period from the entry into force of the TEU until the 
Treaty of Lisbon (1993-2008). Finally, last phase includes the time period since the 
entry into force of Treaty of Lisbon to present time (2009-present). The reason for such 
classification stems from the important breakthroughs in development of the EU foreign 
policy in line with the development of sanctions policy as argued in the second chapter 
of this study. This trend reveals that as the EU continues to develop a more concrete 
foreign policy its adoption of sanctions increases which in turn signals EU‘s attempt for 
transformation to a smart power in the recent years.  
 
 
 
 
78 
 
The First Phase: From EPC to TEU 
 
 Although the use of sanctions as a tool was mentioned with the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957, the EU did not appeal to autonomous sanctions until the 1980s. The only case 
was the EU member states‘ following of UN sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965 which 
was implemented on the level of individual member states (Kreutz, p. 8). The first 
autonomous sanctions were imposed in 1982 against Soviet Union as a response to 
Soviet Union‘s intervention to Poland. The sanctions were result of a process started in 
mid-1970s with the labor protests regarding the poor economic development in Poland. 
Following the protests, Polish government declared martial law and arrested the 
protesters. The EU, despite disagreements among member states who wanted to keep 
good relations with the east such as Germany, decided to withdraw ‗Most Favorable 
Nation‘ treatment to Poland and imposed partial trade embargo to Soviet Union (Kreutz, 
pp. 21-22). The terms of the embargo were quite vague and unclear by only indicating 
that ―the interests of the Community require that imports from the USSR be reduced‖ 
(Official Journal 1982 cited in Koutrakos, 2001, p. 60). Furthermore, the sanctions 
imposed against the Soviet Union suffered from a lack of implementation by the 
member states which signaled the deficiencies of the Community sanctions policy and 
the need for further steps to be taken.  
 Second autonomous sanctions in the history of the EU were imposed against 
Argentina as a response to invasion of Falkland Islands. The conflict between Argentina 
and the UK constituted an important and distinctive case for the EU because the Union 
was faced with an attack on a territory of a member state which put it into a situation 
where a reaction was necessary. Upon the call made by the UK, the EU declared its full 
support for a combined action against Argentina. However, Denmark opposed this 
proposal by arguing that the EU did not have any constitutional right to impose 
sanctions. As a consequence member states agreed on to adopt national measures 
identical to what had been decided at the EU level and imposed arms embargo against 
Argentina (d‘Estmael, 1997, p. 7). Similar to sanctions against the Soviet Union, 
Argentina case also revealed the need for further reform in sanctions policy and foreign 
policy in general.  
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The third autonomous sanctions of the EU were imposed against China in 1989. 
Following the protests in Tiananmen Square and Chinese government‘s use of brutal 
force to move the protesters from the Square led the EU to take measures as a response 
to human rights violations on the level of member states and later on sanctions by the 
EU. These sanctions include diplomatic and economic sanctions consisting of an 
unspecified arms embargo (Jakobson, 2004, p. 51). Fourth, the EU adopted sanctions 
against Burma/Myanmar in 1991 as a response to Burmese governments‘ use of force 
and mass-arrests against the student protesters who were calling for democratic reforms 
in the country. Upon the elections held in Burma, the EU decided to impose arms 
embargo based on the refusal of respect to election results and ongoing human rights 
violations. The EU also took additional measures in the form of restrictions on 
admission to certain individuals responsible for the violations of human rights in the 
country (Giumelli, 2013b, p. 29). Finally, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were also 
targeted by sanctions as a result of the subsequent wars in 1991-1995 and 1992-1995 
which led to disintegration of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The main reason of 
the EU to impose sanctions against Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina was the intrastate 
conflict going on in the region which constituted an important security threat against the 
EU member states territory. In this period, the EU lacked the military capabilities to 
efficiently tackle with the situation on the continent and responded to threat posed by 
imposing arms embargo against both entities.  
Characterization of the First Phase of EU Sanctions Policy Practices 
 
A general characterization of the first phase of EU sanctions policy practice 
reflects the EU‘s deficiencies in this policy area and signaled for the necessity to take 
further steps in this regard. The sanctions in this period were either the result of the UN 
imposition of sanctions and EU‘s following UN tradition or the initiation of member 
states where most of the time imposed on the basis of member states since the EU 
lacked the sufficient legal basis for adoption of sanctions. Additionally, since the EU 
lacked experience, it was unable to respond quickly to challenges proposed by other 
states. Geographically, sanctions are distributed as one case in Americas (Argentina), 
two cases in Asia (Soviet Union and Burma/Myanmar), and two cases in Europe 
(Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) which reflects a homogenous distribution over the 
world. Issue-wise, the sanctions are imposed as a response to threat to territorial 
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integrity of a third country (Soviet Union), human rights violations and respect for 
democracy (China and Burma/Myanmar), and finally intrastate conflict (Crotia and 
Bosnia/Herzegovina). The measures adopted against these countries includes arms 
embargo, partial trade embargo, and restrictions on admission while arms embargo 
being the most common type of sanctions used in this period. This characterization 
shows that the EU in its surrounding region as in the case of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Soviet Union imposed sanctions with the concern of protecting its 
security while in the rest of the world (Argentina and Burma/Myanmar) it is concerned 
about issues that can be considered as ‗low politics‘ such as respect for democracy and 
human rights violations. This reflects the view that in the early years of EU sanctions 
policy practices EU acted more as a regional power rather than a global power which 
also reveals the fact that EU lacked the sufficient mechanism to be a global player in 
world politics although one of the main objectives to ‗have a say in world politics‘.  
 
The Second Phase: From TEU to Treaty of Lisbon 
 
 As the EU moved towards having a more concrete foreign policy with the 
signing of the Treaty on European Union and introduced a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy as a pillar of the Union, the sanctions policy practice also gained pace 
and increased to 23 cases until the Treaty of Lisbon as opposed to only 6 cases in the 
previous phase. The second phase also witnessed more coordinated stance against the 
challenges proposed by the other states in world politics with regard to both 
geographical and issue coverage. Since the increased number of cases in this period 
obstructs a detailed coverage of all sanctions cases, a general overview of EU sanctions 
policy practice is provided.  
 As mentioned above, the second phase witnessed a broad coverage of issues and 
geographical distribution. Following the entry into force of TEU, the EU imposed 
sanctions on Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Nigeria and Sudan in 1993 and 
1994 respectively. Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) was subject to sanctions by 
the EU because of the President Mobutu‘s violation of democratic principles although 
his declaration of the legalization of the parties and promise to hold elections in the 
future. When the election process was disturbed by violence among the ethnic and 
81 
 
political fractions in the society, the EU imposed arms embargo and restrictions on 
admission to Zairian nationals (King, 1999, p. 323). Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Zaire) was again targeted by sanctions for the same reasons in 2005 with measures 
taken as arms embargo, restrictions on provision of certain services, restrictions on 
admission, and assets freeze.  
Similarly, the EU imposed sanctions against Nigeria as a response to violations 
of democratic principles. 1990 and 1992 elections in Nigeria were subject to criticisms 
of electoral fraud when it was proved that the number of votes exceeded the total 
number of registered voters. After free elections in 1993 under the supervision of local 
and international authorities, the military leader of Nigeria suspended the elections 
which were followed by violent protests and military coup in the country. As a response 
to violation of democratic principles and human rights, the EU imposed arms embargo 
against Nigeria. Nigeria was also targeted by sanctions in 1998 due to the same reasons. 
Similar to situation in Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, Sudan was subject to 
sanctions by the EU in 1994. The main reason of sanctions initiation was the Sudanese 
government use of force against the protesters and bombing of civilians following the 
military coup. As a response to violation of democratic principles and human rights, the 
EU imposed arms embargo against Sudan. Furthermore, upon the intrastate conflict of 
2004 the EU adopted stricter measures by adopting restrictions on admission, assets 
freeze, and restrictions on provision of certain services along with arms embargo (Agbu 
1998 cited in Giumelli, 2011, pp. 69-70).  
 Sanctions imposed by the EU in the mid-1990s represented different issue and 
geographic coverage. In 1996, the US, Afghanistan, and Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
were targeted by sanctions. The main motivation behind the EU sanctions against the 
US was to protect EU companies from US laws with regard to conducting business with 
Cuba, Iran, and Libya (Joint Action 1996/668/CFSP). The reason the EU put forward 
was the violation of international law while the measures adopted remained as vaguely 
defined as ―each member state shall take the measures it deems necessary to protect the 
interests of natural and legal persons‖ (Joint Action 1996/668/CFSP). Afghanistan was 
also subject to sanctions in 1996 when the intrastate conflict broke out following the 
Soviet forces‘ withdrawal from the country after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1989. In 1994, a new Islam-based government was established by Taliban which was 
recognized as a terrorist organization. In 1996 the intrastate conflict gained pace and led 
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to serious human rights violations and obstructed humanitarian aid to the country which 
caused a severe refugee crisis. As a response, the EU imposed an arms embargo against 
Afghanistan on the basis of intrastate conflict and support for terrorism. Furthermore, 
Afghanistan was targeted by sanctions in 2001 because of its support to terrorism with 
measures such as restrictions on admission and assets freeze along with arms embargo 
(Kreutz, p. 35). Similar to Afghanistan, Former Republic of Yugoslavia experienced an 
intrastate conflict in the mid-1990s which led to disintegration. During the Kosovo 
crisis the tension in the region increased and Serbian police forces used excessive force 
on the Kosovo Albanian demonstration where more than 80 civilians were killed. 
Following the events, EU imposed an arms embargo which was further strengthened by 
restrictions on admission to certain individuals, partial trade embargo, and assets freeze 
as well as some positive measures such as reconstruction aid and lifting of the oil 
embargo on the Serb municipalities who were opposed to Milosevic regime. Sanctions 
were further renewed in 1998 and 2001 (de Vries, 2002, p. 87).  
 The end of the decade witnessed sanctions imposed against Indonesia and Libya. 
The destabilization in Indonesia started in the mid-1990s in the form of large-scale 
political protests and ethnic conflict as well as financial crisis. The EU‘s connection 
with the conflict was based on Portugal‘s relationship with Indonesia as a former 
colony. The separation movement in East Timor led to serious conflict within the state 
and EU committed itself to contribute to find a solution. After the agreement on to hold 
a referendum with regard to independence to East Timor and the result of the elections, 
the paramilitary groups attacked the independence supporters. As a response, the EU 
imposed an arms embargo and suspended economic aid to Indonesia (King, p. 334). In 
1998, Belarus was targeted with sanctions by the EU because of the ongoing instability 
in the country after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Poor economic conditions helped 
the rise of Lukashenko as a president whose agenda was to continue the traditions of the 
Soviet Union such as introduction of Russian as an official language and introduction of 
Soviet symbols. The referendum held regarding these issues lacked the free and fair 
conditions which followed by political violence where demonstrations were brutally 
suppressed by the police forces and conducted mass arrests. As a response, the EU 
imposed restrictions on admission on the members of the government. Although the 
sanctions were lifted in 1999 following an agreement between the EU and Belarus, the 
domestic political situation did not change in the upcoming years (Kreutz, pp. 37-38). 
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Therefore, sanctions were renewed in 2004 and 2007 on the basis of violation of 
democratic principles and human rights.  
Libya was also subject to EU sanctions because of the 1986 bombing of a 
discotheque in Berlin which killed 4 civilians. This attack constituted a security threat 
on the EU territory which led the EU to take measures such as arms embargo, 
restrictions on admission, and diplomatic sanctions on the basis of support for terrorism. 
In fact, the sanctions episode started in 1986 with the UN Security Council decision 
which EU also followed but in 1999 UN decided to suspend the sanctions against Libya 
(SIPRI, 2012). However, the EU autonomously kept sanctions in force which is the 
reason of the inclusion of sanctions in the second phase of EU sanctions policy in this 
study.  
 In 2001, the EU imposed sanctions under unstable conditions within a different 
context. In the case of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia where a number of individuals 
were engaged in protecting and supporting the indictees of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The EU imposed sanctions against the 
indictees in the form of assets freeze by demanding them to go voluntarily into custody 
(Giumelli, p. 12). At the beginning of 2000s, Zimbabwe was also targeted by sanctions 
because of continuing land ownership issue and events followed since its independence 
in 1980. The referendum on land relocation in Zimbabwe led a serious political violence 
in country where President Mugabe used excessive force on the political opposition 
which led a minimum of 100000 households were forced to leave by the end of 2001. 
As a response to internal repression and violation of democratic principles and human 
rights the EU imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe in the form of arms embargo, 
restrictions on provision of certain goods, restrictions on admission, and assets freeze 
(Eriksson, pp. 200-201). As a result of the violent intrastate conflict in Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia in 2001, the EU imposed an arms embargo to the country (Paes, 
2009, p. 71).  
 Uzbekistan became a target of EU sanctions in 2005 as a result of the use of 
force by the government against the civilians and killings of hundreds of people 
following the uprising in Andijan. Furthermore, the Uzbek government did not allow 
international independent investigation to take place in the region as suggested by the 
UN. As a response, the EU imposed measures including arms embargo, restrictions on 
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the export of military equipment used for internal repression, and restrictions on 
admission (Portela, p. 78). Iran was also subject to sanctions by the EU in 2007 due to 
its violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by concealing plans to enrich uranium. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and international community put 
pressure on Iranian government to reveal its plans whether they are conducted for 
peaceful purposes. Upon the rejection by Iran, the EU imposed sanctions in the form of 
arms embargo, restrictions on admission, assets freeze, and restrictions on import of 
certain goods (Guimelli, pp. 26-27). In the second phase of the EU sanctions policy the 
sanctions imposed on Belarus and China were renewed because of the same reasons in 
the first phase as argued above.  
Characterization of the Second Phase of EU Sanctions Policy Practices 
 
A general characterization of the second phase of EU sanctions policy practice 
reflects the process that EU recorded in the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool 
while there are deficiencies. The number of sanctions significantly increased to 23 
during this phase in comparison to 6 cases in the first phase. The EU has become more 
able to respond challenges faced in world politics more broadly both in terms of 
geographical and issue coverage. Geographically, sanctions policy practice of the EU 
was distributed as one case in Americas (the US); four cases in Asia (Indonesia, 
Uzbekistan, Burma, and China); seven cases in Europe (Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Belarus, and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia); four cases in 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region (Afghanistan, Libya, and Iran); seven 
cases in sub-Saharan Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe), and finally one case that cannot be qualified as a region which is ICTY. 
The sanctions in this phase, thus, reflect a more homogenous distribution across the 
regions in the world and more engagement with the rest of the world compared to the 
first phase.  
Issue-wise, the sanctions are imposed as a response to intrastate conflict 
(Afghanistan, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and Sudan); support for terrorism (Afghanistan, and Libya); internal 
repression (Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe); respect for democracy (Belarus, 
Burma/Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Zimbabwe); human rights 
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violations (Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, China, Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe); violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) (Iran); violation of international law (the US); and finally respect for the Court 
(ICTY). The issue coverage of the sanctions policy reveals that the EU started to engage 
more in the problems of world politics ranging from internal repression to violation of 
international law in comparison to first phase where issue coverage was limited to 
intrastate conflict, human rights violations, and threat to territorial integrity of a third 
country. Therefore, there has been a transformation from dealing with only important 
security issues or direct threats to be interested in issues that can be considered as ‗low 
politics‘ such as violation of international law or respect for the ICTY as well as still 
focusing on the security threats.  
The measures imposed against these countries include arms embargo 
(Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Indonesia, Iran, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe); restrictions on exports 
(Afghanistan); restrictions on export of equipment that can be used for internal 
repression (Burma/Myanmar, and Uzbekistan); restrictions on import (Iran); partial 
trade embargo (Former Republic of Yugoslavia); restrictions on provision of certain 
goods (Zimbabwe); restrictions on provision of certain services (Burma/Myanmar, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan); restrictions on admission (Afghanistan, 
Belarus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Iran, Libya, 
Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe); assets freeze (Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY, Iran, and 
Zimbabwe); restrictions on provision of new banknotes and coins (Iran), and diplomatic 
sanctions (Libya). In comparison to the first phase, the range of measures adopted in 
this phase also expanded while there were only three types of sanctions imposed in the 
former in the form of arms embargo, partial trade embargo, and restrictions on 
admission.  
This characterization of the second phase of EU sanctions policy practices shows 
that the EU has become more engaged with the rest of the world as well as its near 
neighborhood. While there are only 7 cases in Europe, the EU imposed 17 cases of 
sanctions in a wider geography. Regarding the issue coverage, the EU has also 
expanded the issues it focuses on diverting from solely being interested in direct 
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security threats. Therefore, in line with the developments and further integration in 
foreign policy, the EU started to become a more global power that engages in different 
geographical locations and with different challenges on the way to increase its power to 
‗have a say in world politics‘.  
 
The Third Phase: From Treaty of Lisbon to Present 
 
 The third phase of EU sanctions policy practices represents the shortest time 
span while it is the period which EU imposes sanctions most frequently compared to the 
previous two phases. The increasing trend of use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool is 
in line with the development of the EU foreign policy and its move toward a more 
integrated approach with the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon and institutionalization of 
the foreign policy with the establishment of EEAS and introduction of post of High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. With the help of 
institutionalization, the EU has become more able to ‗speak with one voice‘ and 
respond the events in the world politics quickly. This period has witnessed 18 cases of 
sanctions in only 6 years whereas there were 23 cases in the second phase which 
consists of 17 years and only 5 cases in the first phase which includes 12 years. Similar 
to the second phase, the increased number of cases obstructs a detailed coverage of all 
sanctions cases. Therefore, a general overview of sanctions cases will be provided in 
this section.  
 In 2009, Republic of Guinea was subject to sanctions by the EU as a response to 
violent crackdown of the protests by the government. Following the military coup after 
the death of President Lansana Conte, protests erupted against the military government. 
As a response to the government‘s excessive use of force in handling with the protests 
which led to killing of 150 people, the EU imposed sanctions against the Republic of 
Guinea in the form of arms embargo, restrictions on admission, and assets freeze on the 
basis of internal repression, regional instability, and human rights violations (Giumelli, 
2011, p. 61). During the same year the EU renewed sanctions against Zimbabwe on the 
basis of same reasons with the previous sanctions such as internal repression, and 
violation of democratic principles and human rights. The type of sanctions imposed on 
Zimbabwe remained the same as the previous case as well.  
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 The EU confirmed another episode of sanctions against Belarus in 2010 but the 
decision was also to suspend travel ban in order to influence the cost-benefit calculation 
of Belarus government on human rights violations. However no step was taken further 
at the Belorussian side and the government was also reluctant to release the political 
prisoners. Since there was no improvement with regards to democracy, human rights, 
and release of political prisoners, further sanctions were imposed on the regime in the 
form of arms embargo, assets freeze and restrictions on admission (EEAS, 2013, p. 1-
3). In 2010, the sanctions imposed against Iran were also renewed due to no progress in 
Iran‘s uranium enrichment program (Esfandiary, 2013, p. 3).  
 Coté d‘Ivore (Ivory Coast) became subject to sanctions by the EU in 2010 as a 
result of the President Laurent Gbagbo‘s rejection of election results. Coté d‘Ivore 
experienced a significant armed rebellion in 2002 which split the country into two 
camps due to ethnic discord. Following the already delayed elections in 2010 the unrest 
in the country increased due to President‘s rejection of the internationally recognized 
winner of elections Alassane Quattara (BBC, 2014a). Before the UN was able to take 
measures against the government, the EU responded with sanctions following 
Quattara‘s call for cocoa sanctions and the EU banned all EU companies from doing 
business with institutions supported by Gbagbo which caused a huge impact on Coté 
d‘Ivore economy (Vines, 2012, p. 874). The sanctions were imposed on the basis of 
threat to reconciliation in the country and human rights violations in the form of 
restrictions on admission and assets freeze. The sanctions against Coté d‘Ivore were 
renewed in 2012 due to no progress in country with added measures such as arms 
embargo, restrictions on provision of certain services, and import restrictions on 
diamonds.  
 In 2010, the EU also imposed sanctions on Moldova with regard to conflict in 
Transnistria region which declared its independence from the Republic of Moldova after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Following the limited conflict between 
Transnistrian and Moldovan troops, Transnistria gained an autonomous status in the 
country which in fact only recognized by Russia. Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) proposed a resolution to situation but it remained 
ineffective. As a response to the Transnistrian leaders‘ reluctance and obstruction to the 
peace process, the EU imposed sanctions in the form of restrictions on admission 
(Portela, p. 95).  
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 2011 represented a breaking point in the EU sanctions policy practices history. 
The uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa – Arab Spring – 
which started with the demonstrations in Tunisia and sparked the anti-government 
protests in the rest of the region had a huge impact on the EU foreign policy as well as 
in world politics. Although the demonstrations were sudden and unexpected, the EU 
responded very quickly to the events which underlined the process has been taken in 
sanctions policy from the beginning and success of institutionalization of foreign policy. 
The number of sanctions imposed in this period also signals the aforementioned effect. 
In 2011, four MENA countries which experienced anti-government demonstrations 
became subject to sanctions by the EU whose aim is to support the democratic transition 
in these countries. The sanctions imposed against Tunisia were based on the reason of 
misappropriation of state funds and they were imposed in the form of assets freeze to 
certain individuals who were responsible for the undesired behavior (Grieger, 2013, p. 
24). The demonstrations in Tunisia and fled of President Ben Ali‘s from country 
following four weeks of protests created a domino effect and Egypt fell into anti-
government protests after Tunisia. Similar to his Tunisian counterpart, Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak resigned following the events (Schumacher, 2011, p. 107). 
The reason of the EU sanctions was the same with Tunisia which was based on the 
misappropriation of state funds and the measures were taken in the form of assets 
freeze.  
 The situation in Libya and Syria were more complicated than the previous two 
cases. Libya was the third country that fell into anti-government protests where there 
were violent conflicts which ended with the killing of the ruler Muammar Gaddafi. 
While the situation in Tunisia and Egypt represented EU‘s assistance to local authorities 
to consolidate the transition process the protests in Libya and Syria were much more 
violent which in fact is still going on in Syria. Therefore, the EU sanctions against 
Libya and Syria were more directed to undermine the capabilities of the regime from 
repressing the civilian population. The first episode of sanctions imposed on Libya 
aimed to weaken Gaddafi‘s power and the second episode of sanctions which were 
implemented after Gaddafi‘s death were designed to assist the democratic transition 
process. Therefore, the sanctions were imposed on the basis of internal repression and 
violation of democratic principles in Libya in the form of arms embargo, restrictions on 
admission, and assets freeze. Since the conflict between the opposition and Syrian 
89 
 
government is still going on and the country witnessed death of significant number of 
civilians the measures taken against Syria is much stricter than the previous three 
countries (Giumelli, 2013b, p. 35). The types of measures imposed include restrictions 
on provision of certain goods, restrictions on provision of certain services, restrictions 
on import of arms, import restrictions of crude oil and petroleum products, restrictions 
on provision of new Syrian banknotes and coins, restrictions on trade in gold, precious 
metals and diamonds with the Syrian government, restrictions on admission, and assets 
freeze.  
 In 2011, the sanctions against Burma/Myanmar were renewed on the basis of 
violation of democratic principles and human rights in the form of arms embargo, 
restrictions on exports of equipment that can be used for internal repression, and ban on 
provision of certain services (Council of the European Union, 2011). Second renewed 
sanctions in this period were against certain individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
whose activities undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty and threaten the 
security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The measures taken include arms embargo, 
restrictions on admission, assets freeze, and partial trade embargo (Council Decision 
2011/173/CFSP). Following the military coup in Guinea-Bissau in April 2012, the EU 
imposed sanctions in the form of restrictions on admission for the restoration of peace 
and security and respect for democracy. The targeted persons were all military 
personnel and military leadership who were responsible for the coup d‘état (Council 
Decision 2012/285/CFSP). Central African Republic (CAR) also became subject to 
sanctions by the EU in 2013. CAR has been faced instability since its independence 
from France in 1960. Throughout its history, the country has experienced serious 
internal conflicts and military coups. Although there were some steps toward stability in 
recent years, the new Seleka rebel alliance captured the capital of the country and 
ousted the President Francois Bozize in 2012. Following the event, the country was 
fallen into ethno-religious conflict again where thousands of people were misplaced 
(BBC, 2014b) .As a response, the EU imposed sanctions in the form of arms embargo, 
restrictions on admission, restrictions on provision of certain services, and assets freeze 
(Council Decision 2013/798/CFSP).  
 2014 witnessed an important event occurred in Ukraine which caused the EU to 
directly enter into a conflict of interest with the Russian Federation. This was a 
significant event in the history of EU because the EU has become one side in an 
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international crisis while previously the Union played a role as mediator between 
conflicting parties. When Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and his cabinet 
abandoned the agreement regarding closer trade ties with the EU and decided to build 
closer relations with Russia in 2013, several protests occurred in the country‘s capital, 
Kiev, where more than 100000 people gathered. As a response, the government took 
harsher measures against the protesters and violently repressed them. Contrary to 
expectations, the government‘s approach led to increase in protests which were nearly 1 
million people attended. Because of the scale of the protests, President Yanukovcyh 
signed a compromise with the opposition leaders at the beginning of 2014 and fled from 
the country and protesters took control of presidential administration buildings. In the 
following days, a conflict erupted in Crimea which was known as a pro-Russian region. 
At that point, Russia intervened in Crimea in order to protect Russian interests in the 
region. The Crimean Parliament decided to hold a referendum to join Russia and the 
results of the referendum showed that 97% of the public wants Crimea‘s secession from 
Ukraine. The EU leaders, as a response, gathered in Brussels to condemn the Russia‘s 
annexation of Crimea. Later on, sanctions were imposed both on Ukraine and Russia. 
The reasons for sanctions against Ukraine were misappropriation of state funds, human 
rights violations, and threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty and they were 
imposed in the form of assets freeze. On the other hand, Russia was subject to sanctions 
on the basis of violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of a third country and the 
sanctions imposed include restrictions on admission as well as assets freeze.  
Characterization of the Third Phase of EU Sanctions Policy Practices 
 
 A general characterization of the third phase of EU sanctions policy practices 
show that there were significant developments in the sanctions policy in line with the 
development of the foreign policy in a more concrete sense where the EU experienced 
institutionalization of the foreign policy with the introduction of EEAS as the 
administrative body with regard to external relations of the Union and the introduction 
of post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
The number of sanctions imposed in this period is 18 which represent the most frequent 
use of sanctions. The sanctions imposed as a response to the events in the Middle East 
known as ‗Arab Spring‘ constitute 4 cases which can be considered as a selection bias. 
However, without including those cases, the last phase still remains where the sanctions 
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are used most frequently. Although the number of imposed sanctions in this period is 
relatively less than the second period, regarding the time periods of the phases, where 
the third phase consists of only 5 years compared to 17 years in the second phase, it can 
be said that the sanctions have become a more commonly used foreign policy tool for 
the Union in this period. The trend of addressing a broader issue-wise coverage was also 
dominant in this phase although the geographical focus remained narrow.  
 Geographically, sanctions policy practice of the EU in this period was 
distributed as two cases in Asia (Burma/Myanmar and Russia); four cases in Europe 
(Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Ukraine); six cases in Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) Region (Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia); and six 
cases in Africa (Central African Republic, Coté d‘Ivore, Republic of Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, and Zimbabwe). Therefore, the sanctions in this case, unlike the previous one, 
reflect a more regional focus where MENA and Africa were the most sanctioned 
regions followed by Europe.  
Issue-wise, the sanctions are imposed as a response to intrastate conflict (Central 
African Republic and Moldova); internal repression (Republic of Guinea, Libya, Syria, 
and Zimbabwe); respect for democracy (Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Guinea-Bissau, 
Libya, Syria, and Zimbabwe); human rights violations (Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Coté 
d‘Ivore, Republic of Guinea, Syria, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe); release of political 
prisoners (Belarus); restoration of rule of law (Belarus); threat to territorial integrity and 
sovereignty (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine); threat to territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of a third country (Russia); threat to peace process and reconciliation (Coté 
d‘Ivore); regional instability (Republic of Guinea); restoration of peace and security 
(Guinea-Bissau); misappropriation of state funds (Egypt, Tunisia, and Ukraine); and 
finally violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (Iran). The issue coverage of the sanctions 
policy in the third phase represents that the EU started to engage broader problems of 
world politics similar to the second phase. Human rights violations and respect for 
democracy are the most frequent issues that led to sanctions by the EU followed by 
internal conflict. Therefore, security issues have a greater place on the EU agenda in 
this period compared to more homogenous distribution between high politics and low 
politics issues in the second phase. Furthermore, the scale of security issues increased in 
this period ranging from intrastate conflict to regional stability.  
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The measures imposed against these countries include arms embargo (Belarus, 
Burma/Myanmar, Central African Republic, Coté d‘Ivore, Republic of Guinea, Iran, 
Libya, and Zimbabwe); restrictions on export of equipment that can be used for internal 
repression (Burma/Myanmar); restrictions on imports (Coté d‘Ivore, Iran, and Syria); 
restrictions on provision of certain goods (Syria and Zimbabwe); restrictions on 
provision of certain services (Burma/Myanmar, Central African Republic, Coté d‘Ivore, 
and Syria); restrictions on admission (Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African 
Republic, Coté d‘Ivore, Republic of Guinea, Iran, Libya, Moldova, Russia, Syria, and 
Zimbabwe); assets freeze (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Coté 
d‘Ivore, Egypt, Republic of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Libya, Russia, Syria, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, and Zimbabwe), and finally restrictions on provision of new banknotes and 
coins (Iran and Syria). The trend of using wide range of measures also continued in this 
phase similar to second period.  
This characterization of the third phase of EU sanctions policy practices shows 
that the EU has become more active in using sanctions as a foreign policy tool by 
adopting 18 cases of sanctions in only 5 years as stated above. This increased frequency 
of sanctions can be attributed to the development of foreign policy specifically to the 
institutionalization of administrative body which enabled the EU to respond quickly to 
the problems of world politics. Geographical distribution of the sanctions shows that the 
EU has focused more on regions rather than a broad geographical coverage. Regarding 
the issue coverage, the EU has focused more on the security issues in this period which 
mainly stemmed from the subsequent anti-government protests in the MENA region. 
Therefore, in line with the developments and further integration in foreign policy after 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has become a more powerful actor which can take actions 
in serious problems it faces in its surrounding region and the rest of the world.   
 Having explained the general overview of EU sanctions policy practices in three 
phases, a general characterization of EU sanctions in terms of geographical distribution, 
issue coverage, and type of sanctions imposed with regard to each specific period is 
drawn. The following section provides a combined overview of the EU sanctions policy 
practices since 1980 until present time.  
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 Target State Start Year 
of 
Sanctions 
End Year of 
Sanctions 
Issue Sanction 
Type 
1. Afghanistan 1996 1999 Intrastate conflict, 
terrorism, human 
rights violations 
Arms embargo 
2. Afghanistan 2001 Present Terrorism Arms 
embargo, 
restriction on 
exports, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
3. Argentina 1982 1982 Interstate conflict Arms 
embargo, 
trade embargo 
4. Belarus  1998 1999 Internal repression, 
respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Restrictions 
on admission 
5. Belarus 2004 2007 Respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Restrictions 
on admission, 
assets freeze 
6. Belarus  2007 2010 Respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Restrictions 
on admission, 
assets freeze 
7. Belarus 2010 Present Release of political 
prisoners, respect 
for democracy, 
human rights 
violations, 
restoration of rule 
of law 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
8. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1991 2006 Intrastate conflict Arms embargo 
9. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2011 Present Threat to 
sovereignty and 
territorial integrity 
Restrictions 
on admission, 
assets freeze 
10. Burma/Myanmar 1991 2007 Respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Arms 
embargo, 
partial trade 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
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assets freeze 
11. Burma/Myanmar 2008 2011 Respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
exports of 
equipment that 
can be used 
for internal 
repression, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
certain 
services, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze  
12. Burma/Myanmar 2011 Present Respect for 
democracy,  human 
rights violations 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
exports of 
equipment that 
can be used 
for internal 
repression, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
certain 
services 
13. Central African 
Republic 
2013 Present Intrastate conflict Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
certain 
services, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
14. China 1989 2008 Human rights 
violations 
Arms embargo 
15. China 2008 Present Human rights 
violations 
Arms embargo 
16. Coté d‘Ivore (Ivory 
Coast) 
2010 2011 Threat to peace 
process and 
reconciliation, 
human rights 
violations 
Restrictions 
on admission, 
assets freeze 
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17. Coté d‘Ivore (Ivory 
Coast) 
2012 Present Threat to peace 
process and 
reconciliation, 
human rights 
violations 
Arms 
embargo, 
import 
restrictions on 
diamonds, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
certain 
services, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze  
18. Croatia 1991 2000 Intrastate conflict Arms embargo 
19. Democratic Republic 
of Congo (Zaire) 
1993 2003 Respect for 
democracy 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
admission 
20. Democratic Republic 
of Congo (Zaire) 
2005 Present Respect for 
democracy 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
certain 
services, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
21. Egypt 2011 Present Misappropriation of 
state funds  
Assets freeze  
22. Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia 
1996 1998 Intrastate conflict, 
human rights 
violations 
Arms 
embargo, 
partial trade 
embargo, 
flight ban, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
23. Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia 
1998 2000 Intrastate conflict, 
human rights 
violations 
Arms 
embargo, 
partial trade 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
24. Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
2001 2009 Intrastate conflict Arms embargo 
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25. Guinea (Republic of) 2009 Present Internal repression, 
human rights 
violations, regional 
stability 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
26. Guinea-Bissau 2012 Present Respect for 
democracy, 
restoration of peace 
and security   
Restrictions 
on admission, 
assets freeze 
27. International Criminal 
Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY)(against 
Indictees) 
2001 2011  Support for 
effective 
implementation of 
the mandate of 
ICTY 
Assets freeze 
28. Indonesia 1999 2000 Intrastate conflict Arms embargo 
29. Iran 2007 2010 Violation of Non-
Proliferation Treaty 
Arms 
embargo, 
import 
restrictions on 
crude oil and 
petroleum 
products, 
import 
restrictions on 
petrochemical 
products, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
new Iranian 
banknotes and 
coins 
30. Iran 2010 Present Violation of Non-
Proliferation Treaty 
Arms 
embargo, 
import 
restrictions on 
crude oil and 
petroleum 
products, 
import 
restrictions on 
petrochemical 
products, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze,  
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restrictions on 
provision of 
new Iranian 
banknotes and 
coins 
31. Libya 1999 2004 Terrorism  Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
diplomatic 
sanctions 
32. Libya 2011 2011 Internal repression, 
respect for 
democracy 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
33. Libya 2011 Present Internal repression Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
34. Moldova(Transnistria) 2010 Present Intrastate 
conflict(secessionist 
movement) 
Restrictions 
on admission 
35. Nigeria 1993 1998 Respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Arms embargo 
36. Nigeria 1998 1999 Respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Arms embargo 
37. Russia 2014 Present Threat to territorial 
integrity and 
sovereignty of a 
third country 
Restrictions 
on admission, 
assets freeze 
38. Soviet Union 1982 1982(unclear) Threat to territorial 
integrity and 
sovereignty of a 
third country 
Partial trade 
embargo 
39. Sudan 1994 2004 Human rights 
violations 
Arms embargo 
40. Sudan 2004 Present Intrastate conflict, 
human rights 
violations, threat to 
regional stability 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
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certain 
services, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze,  
41. Syria 2011 Present Internal repression, 
respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Restrictions 
on provision 
of certain 
goods, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
certain 
services, 
restrictions on 
import of 
arms, import 
restrictions of 
crude oil and 
petroleum 
products, 
restrictions on 
trade in gold, 
precious 
metals and 
diamonds with 
the Syrian 
government, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
new Syrian 
banknotes and 
coins 
42. Tunisia 2011 Present Misappropriation of 
state funds 
Assets freeze 
43. Ukraine 2014 Present Human rights 
violations, threat to 
territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, 
misappropriation of 
state funds 
Assets freeze 
44. United States 1996 1998 Violation of 
international law 
------------ 
45. Uzbekistan 2005 2009 Internal repression Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
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export of 
equipment that 
can be used 
for internal 
repression,  
restrictions on 
admission 
46. Zimbabwe 2002 2009 Internal repression, 
respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
certain goods, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
47. Zimbabwe 2009 Present Internal repression, 
respect for 
democracy, human 
rights violations 
Arms 
embargo, 
restrictions on 
provision of 
certain goods, 
restrictions on 
admission, 
assets freeze 
Table 1: The List of EU Sanctions Cases (Target State, Start Year of Sanctions, End Year of Sanctions, 
Issue under Dispute, Type of Sanctions Imposed) (The term ‗Present‘ refers to May 2014) 
 
 
EU Sanctions Policy Practices in General 
 
The EU sanctions policy practices on a case by case basis with regard to 
different phases are argued in the previous section. This section, on the other hand, aims 
to present a general overview of the EU sanctions policy practices by referring the 
characteristics of the EU sanctions such as duration of sanctions, geographical 
distribution, issue coverage, and type of sanctions imposed with the help of 
visualizations of the data.  
In the previous sections, it is argued that the EU has engaged in the use of 
sanctions in its relations with the rest of the world in an increasing trend. Although the 
EU employed sanctions 6 times in the following 12 years after the introduction of 
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sanctions as a foreign policy tool, this number has increased to 18 in the last 5 years. 
The increasing trend in the use of sanctions can be seen in the graph below.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
S
a
n
c
ti
o
n
s
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Start Year of Sanctions Imposed by the EU under the Domain of CFSP
N=47; the dataset is created by the author based on the official sources of the EU (Joint Actions and Common Positions)
Reference lines represent the beginning of the second and third phases of the EU foreign policy development
Graph 1: The Frequency of Sanctions Imposed by the EU under the Domain of CFSP
 
Furthermore, an interesting feature emerges with a closer and detailed look at the 
development of EU‘s Common Foreign and Security Policy. As argued in detail in the 
second chapter of this study, the EU foreign policy has undergone substantial 
transformations in three different phases. The first phase started with the introduction of 
London Report in 1981 which constituted the last stage of European Political 
Cooperation. Two months after the launch of London Report, the EU imposed its first 
autonomous sanctions against the Soviet Union as a response to Soviet intervention in 
Poland. After the adoption of first autonomous sanctions, the EU has imposed 47 
sanctions up to date by following an increasing trend. Second major development with 
regard to EU foreign policy integration came in 1992 when the Treaty on European 
Union has established the CFSP as a separate pillar of the Union. Therefore, the 
institutionalization of the foreign policy that started with the establishment of EPC has 
gained pace with the creation of CFSP. This development in foreign policy reflected 
itself in the EU sanctions policy practices as well. In line with further foreign policy 
integration, the EU has started to use sanctions more frequently as a response to 
problems in the world politics. In this phase, which is identified as the second phase in 
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this study, the EU adopted 23 sanctions episodes constituting almost the half of the 
sanctions in the history of EU sanctions policy.  
The final substantial change in foreign policy development was the entry into 
force of Treaty of Lisbon which further institutionalized foreign policy making of the 
EU by creating an administrative body for the workings of Union‘s external relations, 
EEAS, and the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The 
striking evidence in this regard is the great jump in the number of sanctions imposed 
against third countries or individuals. Within only 5 years period following the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the EU has imposed 18 cases of sanctions against the challenges it faces in 
world politics. Therefore, the EU sanctions policy practices shows a progress which is 
in line with the development of foreign policy. In other words, as the integration in 
foreign policy has become deeper the EU has become a power in world politics that 
uses sanctions which are characterized as ‗hard power‘ tools in the literature. Therefore, 
the EU has become able to respond more quickly to the challenges proposed by other 
states or entities in world politics. The table below presents the distribution of sanction 
cases according to different phases of foreign policy development. As it can be seen 
from the last column of the table, a basic calculation by dividing the number of 
sanctions over the years included in the phases reveals how active the EU has become in 
using the sanctions as a foreign policy tool in its external relations.  
Phase Number of 
Sanctions Cases  
Percentage  Frequency of Sanctions 
According to Length of 
Phase 
Phase 1 (1981-1992) 6 12.77% 0.54 
Phase 2 (1993-2008) 23 48.94% 1.53 
Phase 3 (2009-2014) 18
5
 38.30% 3.6 
Total 47 100%  
Table 2: The Frequency of Sanctions Imposed in Three Phases of EU Sanctions Policy Practice (Total 
number of sanctions=47) 
                                                          
5
 As mentioned above, the sanctions imposed against to the events in the Middle East 
(known as the Arab Spring) may be considered as over-representation of the sanctions 
cases in the last phase. In order to overcome such a selection problem, the number of 
cases with regard to Arab Spring (4 cases) is subtracted from the total number of cases 
in this phase. The results indicate the frequency of sanctions given the length of phase is 
2.8 which are still consistent with the main argument of the study.  
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 20 out of total 47 sanctions imposed by the EU are still in force as of May 2014. 
This numbers point out the fact that EU, currently, is very active in using sanctions 
against third countries or individuals who violate the principles of the EU as stated in 
TEU. The mean duration of sanctions is almost 5 years while 1 year being minimum 
and 19 is maximum duration of sanctions in force. The graph below presents a more 
general overview of the duration of EU sanctions. 
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Geographic Distribution of Sanctions Imposed by the EU 
 
 In the above presented sections, the geographic distribution of sanctions with 
regard to their imposed phase of EU sanctions policy practices is discussed in more 
detail. This section provides a more general overview of the geographical distribution 
by focusing the EU sanctions policy practices as a whole. Geographically, most 
sanctioned region by the EU is sub-Saharan Africa (13 cases), followed by European 
non-member states (12 cases), Middle East and North Africa (11 cases), Asia (8 cases), 
and Americas (2 cases). This general overview shows that the EU is more concerned the 
issues and problems occurring in its surrounding regions such as non-member states in 
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Europe, MENA region, and sub-Saharan Africa compared to the rest of the world. As 
argued above, the geographical focus captures a broader area only in the second phase 
while first and the last phase represents a more regional focus by the EU. The narrower 
geographical coverage shows that EU is still likely to be a regional power whose 
primary aim is to protect its own security. Therefore, a general characterization of the 
geographical distribution of sanctions reflects that the EU is not able to be engaged with 
the problems in world politics yet. The graph below presents geographical distribution 
of sanctions imposed by the EU under the domain of CFSP. 
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Graph 3: Geographical Distribution of Sanctions Imposed by the EU
 
Issue Coverage of the EU Sanctions Policy Practices 
 
 A general overview of EU sanctions policy practices shows that the most 
common issue that is subject to sanctions is human rights violations (23 cases) followed 
by respect for democracy (16 cases), intrastate conflict (10 cases), and internal 
repression (8 cases). At first glance, this characterization shows that the EU is more 
focused on issues traditionally considered as ‗low politics‘ such as respect for 
democracy and human rights violations. However, there are also issues that are not as 
common as these stated issues yet consist of majority of issues (22 cases). This category 
is coded as ‗other‘ and it includes both ‗high and low politics‘ issues such as interstate 
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conflict (1 case), supporting terrorism (3 cases), violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (2 
cases), threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity (2 cases), violation of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of a third country (2 cases), threat to peace process and 
reconciliation (2 cases), threat to regional stability (2 cases), restoration of peace and 
security (1 case),  release of political prisoners (1 case), rule of law (1 case), 
misappropriation of state funds (3 cases), support for effective implementation of the 
court (1 case), and finally violation of international law (1 case). This reveals that the 
EU has engaged in issues that address a broad range although the majority of sanctions 
are directed to human rights violations. In this sense, considering that the EU focuses on 
‗low politics‘ issues would be misleading in characterization of the EU sanctions policy 
practices with regard to EU‘s role in world politics.  
 Furthermore, the issues that are the reasons of the sanctions imposed by the EU 
shows that the EU uses sanctions as a foreign policy tool in line with the objectives of 
the CFSP such as ―to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the 
independence of the Union; to strengthen its security and its member states in all ways; 
to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international 
cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms‖. Therefore, although the dominant issues in 
EU sanctions policy practices are the rule of law and respect for human rights, the EU 
addresses other issues stated in CFSP objectives as well. The graph below shows the 
issue coverage of the EU sanctions policy practices.  
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 Joakim Kreutz (2005) argues that although the EU has employed sanctions in its 
near geographical proximity and in the rest of the world, the motivations behind them 
are different. His analysis indicates that the EU has used sanctions as a response to more 
direct security based considerations in its surrounding region, while with regard to the 
rest of the world the EU sanctions policy practices seems to be more sensitive to the 
violation of international law and value-based policy. Since Kreutz‘s analysis captures 
sanctions cases until 2004, his argument is tested with the expanded data until present 
time to see whether that trend still holds true in EU sanctions policy practices. Applying 
the same criteria with Kreutz, the EU near neighborhood is defined as including the 
countries such as non-member European states as well as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia 
(Commission, 2003). Unlike Kreutz‘s findings, present EU sanctions policy reflects a 
similar approach to the near vicinity and the rest of the world. In both categorizations, 
most common issues that lead to sanctions are human rights violations and respect for 
democracy. More surprisingly, in the rest of the world intrastate conflict is the third 
most common issue that is considered as ‗high politics‘ issue which shows an 
unexpected result with regard to Kreutz‘s argument. The graph below shows the issue 
coverage with regard to classification of EU near neighborhood and the rest of the 
world.  
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Types of Sanctions Imposed by the EU 
 
 As argued in the previous sections with regard to three different phases of EU 
sanctions policy practices, there has been a development in the types of sanctions 
imposed over the years. While in the first phase the use of sanctions was limited to arms 
embargo, partial trade embargo, and restrictions on admission, currently the EU has 
expanded its sanctions toolbox with different types of sanctions ranging from 
restrictions on provision of certain goods and services to restrictions on provision of 
new banknotes and coins. A general characterization of the type of sanctions imposed 
by the EU shows that the most commonly adopted measure is arms embargo (32 cases) 
followed by restrictions on admission (29 cases), and assets freeze (28 cases). However, 
such characterization leads to an overlook to the types of sanctions imposed by the EU 
because the other category which includes less common types of measures consist of 32 
different cases including broad range of measures.  
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 This situation stems from different sub-categories of sanctions such as import 
restrictions on petrochemical products which is in essence can be placed under the 
category of trade sanctions. In order to overcome this situation, a different classification 
is used by clustering different sub-categories of sanctions under more general categories 
in accordance with the types of sanctions defined in EU official documents as outlined 
at the beginning of this chapter. Yet, the EU official documents place financial and 
trade sanctions within one category which may be misleading because of their different 
characteristics. In this sense, following classification of Clara Portela (2010), six 
different categories are created namely arms embargo, financial sanctions, trade 
sanctions, restrictions on admission, flight ban, and diplomatic sanctions. According to 
this more general classification, the most commonly used type of sanctions follows the 
previous classification where arms embargo, restrictions on admission, and financial 
sanctions are the most commonly used types of sanctions. However, this new 
classification shows trade sanctions are the fourth most common type of sanctions 
which is overlooked by the first classification by including them in the ‗other‘ category. 
Yet, this does not mean that the EU applies comprehensive sanctions which would 
induce the costs of sanctions on the civilian population. Rather, the EU opts for more 
targeted sanctions even if they were trade sanctions such as restrictions on exports of 
equipment that can be used for internal repression. By doing so, the EU aims to 
minimize civilian suffering and punish the individuals who are responsible for the 
undesired behavior. The graph below presents the distribution of types of sanctions 
imposed by the EU.  
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Drawing the Links between the EU Sanctions Policy Practices and the     
      Characterization of the EU in World Politics 
 
 As argued in detail in the first chapter, the EU and its role in world politics in 
particular has been subject to different characterizations since the establishment of the 
Union. Up to date, the EU has been defined as civilian power, normative power, 
military/strategic power, superpower, and finally smart power. These characterizations 
usually differ from each other while they share certain assumptions. In other words, 
they are not mutually exclusive. All these different characterizations of the EU‘s role in 
world politics and more specifically what kind of power it represents offer a testing 
ground for different implications which the EU sanctions policy practices are among 
many. In this regard, this section aims to draw the line between the EU‘s sanctions 
policy practices with the theoretical arguments presented in the first chapter.  
 Since its establishment, the EU has been defined as a soft power which relies on 
soft power tools such as diplomatic means and economic aid to third countries in its 
relations with the rest of the world. In other words, it has been relied on persuasion 
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rather than coercion in its foreign policy. This feature has been attributed to EU‘s lack 
of sufficient military capabilities by some scholars (Bull 1982; Kagan 2003), while 
others argue that it stems from founding values of the Union (Duchene 1972; Hill 
1983). As the foreign policy of the EU developed over the years and started to have a 
more concrete shape scholars have argued that the EU has been moving from being a 
civilian power and becoming a hard power in its relations with the rest of the world 
(Smith 2000). On the other hand, other scholars have argued that developing a common 
foreign policy and hard power tools does not mean the end of the civilian power EU. 
Rather, with the adoption of hard power means the EU could become a civilian power 
since these means are one kind of among many (Stravridis 2001; Whitman 2002).  
 In line with the arguments regarding the characterization of the EU in world 
politics, adoption of sanctions as a foreign policy tool opens up a new debate. Since 
sanctions are defined as being hard power tools with a coercive nature, does 
incorporating them as a foreign policy tool lead to a change in EU‘s characterization in 
world politics? In other words, which of the theories or arguments presented in the first 
chapter about the EU explains best the current EU sanctions policy practices? One 
general answer can be that the EU sanctions policy is compatible with all of the theories 
above since they are not mutually exclusive. Following Smith (2000), one can argue 
that EU is moving away from being a civilian power since in essence civilian power 
rests on the use of soft power tools while use of sanctions represents being a hard 
power. On the other hand, it can be argued that the EU aims to spread its values such as 
respect for democracy and human rights to the rest of the world via use of sanctions as 
Stravridis (2001) and Whitman (2002) argue.  
 This study argues that the introduction of sanctions as a foreign policy tool 
among many others shows the attempts of the EU for becoming an actor in world 
politics that can be characterized as a smart power. The introduction of sanction as a 
foreign policy tool in 1980s and increasing use of them to bring the desired change in 
the target states‘ or persons‘ policies follows the further integration in foreign policies 
of member states. As argued in the second chapter, there are three phases that can be 
considered as the breakthroughs in foreign policy development at the Union level. The 
first use of sanctions in the history of the EU coincides with the first phase of foreign 
policy development which started with the completion of EPC with the London Report 
in 1981. Since then, the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy tool in an 
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increasing trend as argued in this chapter. Finally, since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the number of sanctions imposed on third parties has reached a 
peak point with the help of institutionalization of foreign policy. Therefore, empirical 
evidence support the main argument of this study that with further integration and 
institutionalization of foreign policy shows the attempts of the EU to become a smart 
power in the world and this attempts reflects itself in the increased use of sanctions as a 
foreign policy tool.   
 Joseph Nye, leading scholar who theorized the term, defines smart power as the 
skillful combination of both hard and soft power. Therefore, smart power relies on both 
coercion and payment on the one hand and attraction on the other. Since use of power 
exists along a continuum as argued in the first chapter, the EU aims to move towards the 
‗coercion‘ pole of such continuum which represents pure use of ‗hard power‘ by the 
policy makers with the increasing trend of use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. 
However, given the already existing foreign policy tool that represents ‗soft power‘, the 
EU still does not locate itself far away from the ‗attraction‘ pole of the continuum. 
Furthermore, given the EU‘s inability or lack of coercion through military force 
prevents the EU becoming closer to the ‗coercion‘ pole. Therefore, if the EU is able to 
manage to become a smart power in the future, it is more likely to become a smart 
power of its own kind.  
 To sum up, the EU‘s incorporation of sanctions in it foreign policy toolbox 
among other soft power measures reveals that the EU attempts to become a smart power 
in world politics. This situation is also in line with Olli Rehn‘s argument where he 
defines the EU as ―combining soft and hard power better in the EU‘s external relations 
by using the whole spectrum of the Union‘s policy instruments and economic 
resources‖ (2009, p. 3). Furthermore, Rehn argues that for more effective 
implementation of smart power strategies, the EU needs to improve external policy 
instruments, its institutional architecture, and is should define clearer foreign policy 
objectives. A more detailed look at the EU‘s sanctions policy practices shows that the 
EU acts in the light of Rehn‘s highlights in implementing sanctions against third 
countries or individuals in the world. As argued in more detailed throughout this 
chapter, the institutionalization of the foreign policy of the EU has improved the 
implementation of sanctions by the EU. Thanks to these developments which are a 
result of the cumulative development over the years the EU has become much more 
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able to respond the problems in world politics both in its near neighborhood and in the 
rest of the world.  
 
Implications for Further Research 
 
 The present study provides a detailed explanation of EU sanctions policy 
practices with regard to separate three phases and in general. The main argument refers 
that as the EU‘s foreign policy has developed over the years and more concrete steps 
taken towards this aim, the EU has become more able to take actions or respond to the 
problems it faces in external world. This in turn helped the beginning of transformation 
of EU‘s characterization in the world politics with regard to type of power it represents 
from being a civilian power or soft power that relies on soft power tools such as 
diplomacy to being a smart power which can combine both tools. However, this study 
lacks the analysis regarding the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the EU. The 
EU imposes sanctions increasingly in the recent years, but whether they are successful 
in bringing the desired change in the target‘ policies still remain in question. Given the 
combined economic power of 28 member states, the EU can impose significant costs on 
the target which have the possibility to induce a change. This would in turn help the 
development of the EU as a more effective smart power in world politics. Therefore, 
future research can focus on the effectiveness of the EU sanctions policy practices in 
order to have a more thorough understanding of the utility of sanctions imposed by the 
EU.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Since its inception, the EU has been subject to different characterizations as a 
power it represents in the world politics due to its sui generis nature. In this sense, it has 
been characterized as ‗soft power‘, ‗civilian power‘, ‗military/strategic power‘, 
‗normative power‘, ‗superpower‘, and finally as a ‗smart power‘. The scholars have 
approached this question from different perspectives and eventually came up with 
different typologies as the EU has continued to develop in its foreign policy as well as 
other policy areas. Since the concept of power and its typologies are defined according 
to the foreign policy tools that an actor usually relies on, such as diplomatic, economic, 
or military measures, identifying the measures that an actor implements carries a great 
importance. In this sense, the introduction of the sanctions as a foreign policy tool of the 
EU in the 1980s and additionally use of sanctions in an increasing trend in the following 
years presents a puzzle to understanding of the typology of EU‘s power which has 
traditionally been characterized as a ‗soft power‘. The reason for emergence of such a 
puzzle stems from the nature of sanctions which gains utility through imposing 
economic coercion to the target state. Coercion is a tool for hard power which also 
makes economic sanctions as hard power tools although they are still ‗softer‘ than 
coercion through military force. Therefore, the EU‘s increasing use of sanctions leads to 
a redefinition of its role in world politics. Stefan Lehne (2012), on this point, argues that 
the EU has redefined itself as an actor through acquiring sanctions as a ‗hammer‘.  
 In order to provide an explanation to the puzzle introduced by increasing use of 
sanctions by the EU, this study focuses on the development of foreign policy at the EU 
level in order to understand the process which has led to the EU in such a direction in its 
foreign policy instruments. A detailed historical analysis of the EU foreign policy shows 
that there are three important breakthroughs in the history of the EU which led to a 
further integration and thus institutionalization of foreign policy. First major event for 
further integration occurred with the introduction of European Political Cooperation as 
the first major foreign policy integration attempt which was completed in 1981 with the 
London Report. Since it was completed in 1981, this study considers this date as the 
beginning of the first phase of foreign policy development. In this process, there was no 
major institutional reform with regard to foreign policy and the cooperation and 
coordination among the foreign policies of member states was on the consultation level.  
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 When the sanctions cases that are imposed in this period are analyzed, the results 
also show that the EU sanctions policy practices are not developed and are not 
implemented effectively. The frequency of sanctions is low (6 cases between 1981 and 
1992) which is geographically diverse but limited in scope of the issues covered. The 
trend in this period shows that the EU implemented sanctions with security purposes in 
its surrounding geography while in the rest of the world it followed policies regarding 
issues that can be considered as ‗low politics‘ such as respect for democracy and human 
rights violations. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the EU has acted as a regional 
actor in this period rather than a global actor who ‗has a say in world politics‘. 
 The second major breakthrough with regard to foreign policy development came 
with the entry into force of Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the introduction of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy as a separate pillar of the EU. Creation of CFSP 
was an important attempt through which for the first time in the history of the EU, the 
foreign policy has gained substance in a more realistic sense. Therefore, through 
making foreign policy as a separate policy area, the EU took a step forward in the 
integration and institutionalization process of the foreign policy. When the EU sanctions 
implemented in this period are analyzed, it is seen that there is a development with 
regard to EU sanctions policy practices. The number of sanctions has significantly 
increased to 23 between the years 1993 and 2008 compared to 6 cases in the first phase. 
Therefore, the frequency of sanctions per year has increased by three times.  
Furthermore, a more homogenous geographical distribution reveals that the EU has 
become more engaged with the rest of the world as well as its surrounding region. 
Regarding the issue coverage, there was also development towards a more general 
coverage from diverting its interests solely on the security threats. This trend shows that 
with further integration and institutionalization in the second phase the EU has become 
more able to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool with a broader geographical and issue 
coverage. 
 Finally, the third major breakthrough happened when the Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force. Treaty of Lisbon has brought significant innovations to the EU 
foreign policy development with institutional reforms. The main institutional change 
regarding the EU foreign policy in this period was the introduction of the post of High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the introduction of the post of 
the President of the Council, and establishment of European External Action Service. 
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The creation of a post to be responsible for the Union‘s relations with the rest of the 
world and the post of President of the Council brought continuity to the implementation 
of foreign policy which eventually paves the way for more effective foreign policy 
making. Furthermore, the creation of EEAS whose responsibility is to support the High 
Representative and run as the executive body of the foreign policy has brought a 
substantial practicality to respond quickly to the events in the world as well as other 
foreign policy tools. Another important development was the change in the decision 
making procedure which also contributed to the increase of the number of sanctions 
imposed. With the help of these changes the EU has become able to implement 
sanctions more frequently.  
 When the EU sanctions policy practices in this final phase is analyzed, the 
results show that the number of sanctions implemented has reached its peak in the 
history of the EU with 18 cases only in 5 years. Therefore, this phase represents the 
most frequent use of sanctions of the EU sanctions policy practices. However, 
geographically this phase represents a more focused view on the near neighborhood of 
the EU which contradicts with the expectations. Regarding issue coverage, the EU has 
returned to its practices in the first phase by focusing more on the security threats which 
mainly stems from the outbreak of mass protests in the Middle East and North Africa 
and increase in the number of intrastate conflicts in the sub-Saharan Africa.  
 To recap, this study argues that the increasing use of sanctions as a foreign 
policy tool by the EU has become possible with the further integration and 
institutionalization of the EU foreign policy over the years through the interaction of the 
internal and external dynamics which are explained in detail in the second chapter. 
Through this further integration and institutionalization the EU has attempted become a 
power that is defined as ‗smart power‘ which relies on hard power tools as well as soft 
power tools to effectively respond to the challenges in the global era by redefining its 
role in the world. However, being a ‗smart power‘ also necessitates efficient use of the 
instruments in an actor‘s toolkit. Since this study does not focus on the effectiveness of 
sanctions implemented by the EU, it would be misleading to indicate that the EU has 
become a ‗smart power‘. The effectiveness of sanctions implemented by the EU is 
another subject that needs attention and a careful analysis. Furthermore, without the 
existence of military capabilities which are considered as the real hard power tools, the 
EU is not likely to become a ‗smart power‘ as it is defined traditionally. Therefore, this 
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study argues that with the attempts of redefining its role in the world, the EU has taken 
huge steps in foreign policy development with regard to further integration and 
institutionalization which brought continuity and practicality to the foreign policy 
making of the Union. Through these developments, the EU has become able to use 
sanctions as a foreign policy tool in an increasing trend which is likely to lead the EU, 
with the effective implementation of sanctions, to become ‗a smart power of its own 
kind‘ in the future.  
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